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INTRODUCTION
C HARITABLE trusts and nonprofit corporations have long been governedby state law and overseen by state officials, such as state attorneys
general.' Just as state law has regulated charitable entities in general, so
has state law regulated fiduciaries' of charitable entities. State law governs
the conduct of charity fiduciaries in no small part by subjecting them to
I Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. The author thanks all those
who participated in the discussion at which this paper was presented at the January 8, 20! l
meeting of the Non-Profit Law and Philanthropy Section of the Association of American Law
Schools. The author also thanks the University of Houston for its financial support of this
paper, and the author's wife, Tami Buckles, for her constant support.
2 See Terri Lynn Helge, Policing the Good Guys: Regulation of the Charitable Sector Through a
FederalCharity OversigtBoard 19 CORNELL J.L. & Pus. Pot'Y 1, 13 (2009) ("The enforcement
power of the state attorney general has been rooted in the common law for centuries."); Marion
R. Fremont-Smith, The Search for Greater Accountability of Nonprofit Organizations: Recent Legal
Developments and Proposals for Change, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 609, 61o (2oo7) ("Enforcement of
state laws is the unique province of the attorneys general who have traditionally had exclusive
jurisdiction to bring wrongdoing to the attention of state courts, with the courts empowered to
apply a wide range of sanctions to assure compliance with the rules and remedy violations.").
3 In broadly defined terms, a "'fiduciary,"' is a person who "acts on behalf of another ...
while exercising discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to" the one for whom
the fiduciary acts. D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1399, 1402 (2002). A charity fiduciary is thus one who oversees or manages a charitable
entity, and includes a trustee of a charitable trust, a director of a charitable corporation, and an
officer of a charitable entity. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 300
cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) [hereinafter PLNO].
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fiduciary duties.' Perhaps the most foundational of these is the duty of
loyalty.s
Notwithstanding the historically significant role of the states in
regulating charities,' the duty of loyalty owed by trustees of charitable
trusts and directors of charitable corporations under state law is now largely
eclipsed by federal tax laws that effectively regulate fiduciary behavior.
4 See Lloyd Hiroshi Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the Twenty-First
Century: An Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479, 491 (2010) ("With respect
to current standards, there is general agreement that charity leaders owe their organizations
two duties under state laws: care and loyalty," observing a duty of "obedience" is a duty some
people recognize that may not be entirely distinct from the other two.); see id. at 495 ("[S]tate
attorneys general are vested with primary responsibility for regulating governance, but most
state attorneys general offices lack the resources or the will to actively enforce state fiduciary
standards.").
5 Cf RESTATEMENT (ThIRD) OF TRUSTS ch. 15, intro. note (2007) (stating that the duty of
loyalty is "often called the 'cardinal' principle of fiduciary relationships," but is "particularly
strict in the law of trusts"); UNIF. TRusT CODE § 802 cmt. (amended 2004) (characterizing the
duty of loyalty as "perhaps the most fundamental duty of the trustee"); AUsTIN WAKEMAN
ScoTT, WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER & MARK L. ASCHER, SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 17.2
(5th ed. 2007) [hereinafter SCOTT AND ASCHER ON ThUSTs] ("The most fundamental duty of a
trustee is the duty of loyalty.").
6 The academic literature discussing problems in, and proposed reforms of, state laws
regulating fiduciary behavior is vast. See, e.g., Carter G. Bishop, The Deontological Significance of
Nonprofit Corporate Governance Standards: A Fiduciary Duty of Care Without a Remedy, 57 CATH.
U. L. REV. 701 (2oo8); Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the
Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457 (1996) [hereinaf-
ter Brody, Agents]; Evelyn Brody, Charity Governance: What's Trust Law Got to Do with It?, 8o
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 641 (2005); Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L.
REV. 1400 (1998) [hereinafter Brody, The Limits]; Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and
Paternalism in State Charity Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937 (2004) [hereinafter Brody, Whose
Public?); Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of a Private Foundation s Governance and Self-Interested
Fiduciaries Calls for Further Regulation, 50 EMORY L.J. 1093 (2001); Deborah A. DeMott, Self-
Dealing Transactions in Nonprofit Corporations, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 13 (1993); James J. Fishman,
Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218 (2003); Susan N. Gary, Regulating
the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAw. L. REV. 593
(i 99); Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes,
Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631 (1998); Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming
Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1981); Henry Hansmann, The Evolving Law
of Nonprofit Organizations: Do Current Trends Make Good Policy?, 39 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 807
(1989); Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999 Wis.
L. REV. 227; Dana Brakman Reiser, Director Independence in the Independent Sector, 76 FORDHAM
L. REV. 795 (2007); Norman I. Silber, NonprofitInterjurisdictionality, 8o CMI.-KENT L. REv. 613
(2005); Linda Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization of Nonprofit Governance: Transforming Obedience
into Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 893 (2007); Jeremy Benjamin, Note, Reinvigorating Nonprofit
Directors' Duty of Obedience, 30 CARDozo L. REV. 1677 (2oog); Denise Ping Lee, Note, The
Business Judgment Rule: Should It Protect Nonprofit Directors?, 103 CoLuM. L. REV. 925 (2003).
7 Cf Brody, The Limits, supra note 6, at 1414 ("Regulatory authority over nonprofit fidu-
ciaries, particularly charity managers, has moved increasingly to the federal level through the
income tax laws.").
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FEDERALIZATION OF DUTY OF LOYALTY
This Article describes, analyzes, and evaluates this federalization of the
duty of loyalty embodied in the federal tax regime.
Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the nature of the duty of
loyalty under state law, particularly as it is articulated under modern reform
proposals, model acts, and restatements of law. It discusses both the content
of the duty of loyalty and the remedies for its breach.
Part II discusses the federalization of the duty of loyalty inherent in
fundamental requirements for obtaining and maintaining exemption from
federal income taxation as a charitable entity. This Part explains how the
duty of loyalty lies at the heart of the general organizational and operational
tests governing tax-exempt charities, the prohibition against excessive
private benefit, and the absolute prohibition against private inurement of
net earnings.
Next, Part III of this Article discusses the federalization of the duty
of loyalty through the labyrinthine federal excise tax regime governing
charities. After briefly discussing four major types of charitable entities
or entity components (private foundations, unaffiliated public charities,
supporting organizations, and donor-advised funds), the Article surveys the
excise tax regime governing various transactions of each type of entity. Part
III then observes that numerous disparate standards and rules pertaining
to the duty of loyalty emerge from the federal excise tax regime-supra-
trustee - standards, trustee standards, and nonprofit-corporate-director
standards (which include procedural fairness rules).
Part IV of this Article identifies and articulates important assumptions
that appear to underlie the federalization of the duty of loyalty under
United States tax law. These assumptions pertain to (1) the inadequacy
of state law fiduciary standards and enforcement mechanisms; (2) the
inadequacy of the fundamental income tax exemption requirements
in ensuring adherence to the duty of loyalty; and (3) other assumptions,
sometimes conflicting, that relate to the behavior of fiduciaries and large
donors (and related persons) and appear to underlie the federal excise tax
system governing charities.
Part V of this Article assesses the current federalized duty of loyalty.
It first concludes that the governmental interest in federalizing the duty
of loyalty is strong. Second, this Part concludes that the governmental
interest in producing a rational uniformity of fiduciary loyalty standards
is strong but unrealized. Third, this Part analyzes the interaction between
the federalized duty of loyalty and state law loyalty standards and remedies
for breach. It observes the effect of correspondence and variance between
state and federal loyalty standards and discusses the nature and purpose
of federal sanctions and their likely effect on state law remedies when the
duty of loyalty has been breached.
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I. THE DUTY OF LOYALTY UNDER STATE LAW
A. Overview of the Duty of Loyalty
Traditionally, the duty of loyalty owed by the governing board of a
charitable entity has depended upon the organizational form of the entity.
The directors of nonprofit corporations owe fiduciary duties articulated
under state nonprofit corporation laws that mimic their for-profit
counterparts, whereas the trustees of charitable trusts are generally held to
the fiduciary standards crafted under the common law of trusts.
A director of a nonprofit charitable corporation typically must act in
"good faith" and in accordance with what the director believes (or reasonably
believes) to be in the "best interests of the corporation."' Plainly, when a
charity enters into a transaction with a director in which the latter may
profit, the duty of loyalty compels her not to benefit at the charity's expense.
For example, a director would breach her duty of loyalty by intentionally
charging a charity above-market interest on a loan.' Disinterested directors
may also breach their duty of loyalty by intentionally conferring a financial
benefit on an interested director to the detriment of the charity. 0 When
presented with a situation in which the interests of a charitable nonprofit
corporation conflict with the interests of directors and related persons, the
duty of loyalty encourages directors to act in accordance with procedural
safeguards." Although some statutes prohibit loans to directors (and
officers)," generally there is no outright prohibition against transactions
between a director and the nonprofit corporation that she oversees.
8 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 523i(a) (West 2009) (requiring a director to act "in good
faith, [and] in a manner that director believes to be in the best interests of the corporation");
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. iSo, § 6C (West zoo5) (imposing a nearly identical standard); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1702.30(B) (LexisNexis 2009) (stating that a director must act "in good
faith, [and] in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in or not opposed to the best
interests of the corporation"); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5712(a) (West 2010) (requiring a direc-
tor to act "in good faith, [and] in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests
of the corporation"); TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 22.22I(a) (West 20o) (imposing a similar
standard).
9 See, e.g., Spitzer v. Schussel, 792 N.Y.S.2d 798, 800-04 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (denying in part a
motion to dismiss a claim against a former fiduciary who allegedly breached his duty of loyalty
by charging a nonprofit organization excessive interest).
to See, e.g., PLNO, supra note 3, H§ 365 cmt. c, illus. 1, 370 cmt. c(2), illus. 2.
II See, e.g., MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.6o(a) (2oo8) [hereinafter MNCA, 2oo8]
(stating that a conflict-of-interest transaction is not voidable if, in relevant part, the board is
informed of material facts and a majority of disinterested directors approve the transaction);
id. § 8.31 cmt., Note on Ditraors' Liability (2) (stating that an interested director incurs no li-
ability if one of the procedures of section 8.60 has been followed).
12 Loans between a director or officer and the corporation that she oversees or manages
are forbidden in states that follow the 1987 REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT.
See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.32(a) (1987) [hereinafter RMNCA]. An
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Trustees of charitable trusts historically have been subject to more
rigid prohibitions against self-dealing than those applicable to corporate
fiduciaries." Under the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, a trustee must act
"solely in the interest of the beneficiary."14 Similarly, under the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust,
a trustee has a duty to administer the trust solely . . . in furtherance of
its charitable purpose.""s Accordingly, under the latter, the duty of loyalty
"strictly prohibit[s]" the trustee "from engaging in* transactions that
involve self-dealing or that otherwise involve or create a conflict between
the trustee's fiduciary duties and personal interests" except in "discrete
circumstances." 6 The duty of loyalty is breached even if "the action in
question was taken in good faith," "the terms of the transaction were fair,"
and "no profit resulted to the trustee."" A leading treatise summarizes the
law as follows:
In a nutshell, the duty of loyalty ordinarily requires trustees to avoid all
transactions that involve self-dealing, as well as those that involve or might
create a conflict between the trustee's fiduciary and personal interests.
Failure to comply with this duty opens the trustee to liability for breach of
trust and subjects the trustee to the "no further inquiry rule." Under this
rule, a trustee who has violated the duty of loyalty is liable without further
inquiry into whether the breach has resulted in any actual benefit to the
trustee, whether the trustee has acted in good faith, whether the transaction
was fair, or even, in some cases, whether the breach has caused any actual
harm to either the trust or its beneficiaries. In addition, the courts have
often loaded the dice rhetorically, stating proudly that a trustee's duty not
to engage in transactions that involve self-dealing or that involve or might
create conflicts of interest is "strict" or "absolute."'
The "discrete circumstances" under which self-dealing is permitted
include (among a few other grounds) court approval of the transaction,"
optional provision in the more recent model act generally forbids such loans. See, e.g., MNCA,
2oo8, supra note I I, § 8.32(a).
13 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. a (2007) ("The duty of loyalty is, for
trustees, particularly strict even by comparison to the standards of other fiduciary relation-
ships.").
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1959). For a critique of the traditional
trust law formulation of the duty of loyalty, see John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law
Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929 (2005).
15 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(I) (2007); see, e.g., In re The Taylor Orphan
Asylum, 36 Wis. 534, 552 (1875).
16 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(2) (2007).
17 Id. § 78 cmt. b.
18 Scorr AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS, supra note 5, § 17.2 (citations and footnote references
omitted). The duty of loyalty, of course, governs trustees of charitable trusts and private trusts
alike. See id. § 37-3. 1.
19 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(2) Cmt. C(I) (2007).
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consent to the transaction by all beneficiaries,20 authorization of the
transaction by the trust instrument,21 and the payment of reasonable
compensation to the trustee." These exceptions, however, still subsume
protections to ensure that a conflict-of-interest transaction is fair (in some
meaningful sense) to the beneficiaries. For example, court approval of a self-
dealing transaction requires a finding that the transaction is in the interest
of the beneficiaries.23 When the trust instrument itself authorizes self-
dealing, "a trustee violates the duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries by acting
in bad faith or unfairly."2 4 Beneficiary consent to a self-dealing transaction
is effective only if the trustee is dealing fairly and communicates material
facts.z Finally, trustee compensation must be "reasonable," 6 and, under
some formulations, "fair to the beneficiaries."27
2o Id. cmt. c(3).
21 Id. cmt. c(2) ("For example, the terms of a trust may permit the trustee personally to
purchase trust property or borrow trust funds, or to sell or lend the trustee's own property or
funds to the trust.").
22 Id. cmt. c(4) ("The strict prohibitions against transactions by trustees involving con-
flicts between their fiduciary duties and personal interests do not apply to the trustee's taking
of reasonable compensation for services rendered as trustee."); see also id. § 38(1) ("A trustee
is entitled to reasonable compensation out of the trust estate for services as trustee, unless the
terms of the trust provide otherwise or the trustee agrees to forgo compensation."); Langbein,
supra note 14, at 939-41 (contrasting the American rule, which allows trustee compensation,
with the traditional English rule, which does not). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 78(2) cmts. c, c(I)-(8) (2007) (describing several exceptions to the general prohibi-
tion against self-dealing by trustees).
23 See id. § 78 cmt. c(i). However, section 802(b)(2) of the UNIFORM TRUST CODE does
not, on its face, condition court approval of a self-dealing transaction on such a finding. UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 802(b)(2) (amended 2005).
24 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(2) Cmt. C(2) (2007). However, "fair" is not
synonymous with "at market value" in this context. Id. ("[Tihe authorization may allow the
trustee to purchase certain trust property at a stated or formula price that amounts to a ben-
eficial ... option price. Such a purchase would not be 'unfair' even though for less than a fair-
market consideration."). Interestingly, section 8oz(b)(i) of the UNIFORM TRUST CODE does
not, on its face, condition trust instrument authorization of self-dealing on a showing of fair-
ness by the trustee. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802 (b)(i) (amended 2oo5). However, the terms of
trust may never authorize a trustee to act other than in the interests of the beneficiaries. See
id. § 105(b)(2).
25 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(3) cmt. g (2007); Langbein, supra note 14, at
964-65. Similarly, the UNIFORM TRUST CODE sets forth an exception to the general prohibition
against self-dealing for a transaction to which the beneficiary consents, if the beneficiary is ap-
prised of material facts and the trustee has not induced consent through "improper conduct."
See UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 802(b)(4), 1009 (amended 2005). The comment to section 1oo9 of
the UNIFORM TRUST CODE cites the traditional rule that the beneficiary's consent is binding
"only if the transaction was fair and reasonable." UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1009 cmt. (amended
2005) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 170(2), 216(3) & cmt. n (1959)).
26 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 38(1), 78 cmt. c(4) (2007); UNIF. TRUST CODE
§ 802(h)(2) (amended 2oo5).
27 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(h)(2) (amended 2oo5) (stating that the duty of loyalty does
not preclude paying the trustee reasonable compensation if "fair to the beneficiaries").
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Some modern reform proposals seek to merge fiduciary standards
regardless of the form of the charitable entity."l Thus, under the American
Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations ("PLNO"),
the duty of loyalty requires each director/trustee of any form of charity "to
act in a manner that he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests
of the charity."" When the interests of a charity do or might conflict with
the interests of directors and related persons, PLNO encourages directors
to act in accordance with procedural safeguards similar to those typically
applicable under nonprofit corporation statutes.3 0
B. Remedies for Breach of the Duty of Loyalty
A variety of approaches for redressing a trustee/director's breach of the
duty of loyalty exist. PLNO offers a range of options and a good discussion of
the propriety of each in various circumstances involving breach of fiduciary
duty. PLNO initially places upon the governing board the duty to take
"reasonable steps to correct" a failure to discharge fiduciary duties "and
remedy the harm, if any, to the charity."31 If an individual member of the
governing board becomes aware of another member's intentional breach
of the duty of loyalty, the former must "take reasonable and appropriate
action," and normally "need only seek to induce action by the board.""
The board may need to remove one of its members for breach of fiduciary
28 See, e.g., PLNO, supra note 3, Reporter's Memorandum at xxxiii ("Chapter 3 tries ... to
set forth a uniform set of rules of governance for both corporate charities and charitable trusts
..... ); PLNO, supra note 3, ch. 3, topic I, intro. note at 17 ([Tlhese Principles apply uniform
legal standards of loyalty and care to fiduciaries of all types of charities . I . ."); PLNO, supra
note 3, § 300, cmt. a on subsection (a) ("The term'fiduciary' ... generally embraces a trustee
of a charitable trust, a member of the board of directors of a corporate charity, and anyone else
serving a similar role.").
29 PLNO, supra note 3, § 3' o(a).
30 See, e.g., id. §§ 310(b), 330 (setting forth procedures for approving conflict-of-interest
transactions sufficient to avoid a shift in the burden of proving a transaction's fairness to a
defendant).
31 Id. § 350(a).
32 Id. § 35o(b). However, if a board member is unable to convince a majority of the board
to remedy or prevent an act of self-dealing or other intentional breach of the duty of loyalty,
she may have a duty to seek a judicial remedy. PLNO, supra note 3, § 350 cmts. b(3 )-(4 ). This
principle finds support both in the law of trusts, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §
39 cmt. a, illus. 1 (2003); id. § 81 cmt. e (stating that a trustee might reasonably decide not to
sue to redress a breach of trust); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 703(g) (amended 2oo5), and in the law
of corporations. See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822-29 (N.J. 1981) (dis-
cussing the duty of a director to employ various methods-including threatening to sue-to
prevent breach of fiduciary duties by others); RMNCA, supra note 12, § 8.o9(b) (authorizing
a director to bring an action on behalf of the nonprofit corporation to remove a director for
various types of malfeasance).
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duty (if empowered to do so under the governing instrument) or even sue
"for damages or injunctive relief against wayward fiduciaries."
Moving beyond the actions required of a board, PLNO directs a
"regulator or court" to "provide a remedy that is in the best interests of the
charity."" This open-ended approach reflects the reality that state statutes
"rarely specify remedies for breach of fiduciary duties,"" thereby allowing
state attorneys general and judges to craft remedies in their discretion.3 6
The following are available civil remedies for breach of a fiduciary duty:
"an accounting, declaratory judgment, reprimand, specific performance,
injunction, appointment of a receiver, restitution, . . . imposition of
surcharge or damages, removal, and liquidation of the charity."3 Non-
monetary remedies include appointing new board members, 3 removing
board members,39 and implementing governance reforms." Liquidation
is generally appropriate only when the court finds that an independent,
properly functioning board to govern the charity is not likely to exist, in
which case assets should be transferred to another charity organized for
similar purposes.4 1
Although damages are not generally imposed on directors of a nonprofit
corporation, a breach of the duty of loyalty resulting in financial gain to the
interested director may cause her to be monetarily liable to the charitable
entity.42 This monetary liability could take the form of legal damages
or restitution.43 The latter requires the disgorgement of profits, if they
exceed legal damages." Importantly, if the governing board of a nonprofit
corporation follows proper procedures when handling a transaction in which
a director is financially interested, or if, in the alternative, the transaction
is fair to the corporation when authorized by the board, then neither
the interested director nor disinterested directors will be liable to the
corporation, even if the interested director receives some benefit from the
33 PLNO, supra note 3, § 350 cmt. a. A charitable corporation, acting through its govern-
ing board, can bring a suit for damages against a director for breach of fiduciary duties. See, e.g.,
In re Bos. Reg'I Med. Ctr., Inc., 328 F Supp. 2d 130, 144-47 (D. Mass. 2oo4).
34 PLNO, supra note 3' § 36o.
35 Id. § 360 cmt. b(i).
36 Id.
37 Id. § 360 cmt. b(2).
38 See id.
39 See, e.g., MNCA, 2008, supra note I I, § 8.o9(a); RMNCA, supra note I2, § 8.I(a).
40 See PLNO, supra note 3, § 360 cmt. b(2).
41 See id.
42 See, e.g., MNCA, 2008,supr note I I, § 8.3 I(a)(2)(v); PLNO,supra note 3, § 370.
43 See PLNO, supra note 3, § 36o crnt. b(2); MNCA, 2oo8, supra note I I, § 8.31 cmot., Note
on Directors' Liability (4), (5), and (6).
44 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 43(1)(a), 2(a)
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
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transaction.4 1 PLNO provides for a similar result in the case of all charitable
entities,' although compliance with PLNO's procedures merely creates
a "rebuttable presumption"47 that the conflict-of-interest transaction was
fair to the charity and in its best interests; one challenging the transaction
bears the burden of proving that it was not.48 One may conceptualize this
framework as requiring "substantive fairness" and/or "procedural fairness"
in the case of transactions between an interested fiduciary and her charity.
11. THE FEDERALIZATION OF THE DUTY oF LOYALTY THROUGH FUNDAMENTAL
EXEMPTION REQUIREMENTS
This Part discusses the federalization of the duty of loyalty inherent in
fundamental requirements for obtaining and maintaining exemption from
federal income taxation as a charitable entity. The duty of loyalty lies at
the heart of the general organizational and operational tests governing tax-
exempt charities, the prohibition against excessive private benefit, and the
absolute prohibition against private inurement of net earnings.' This Part
explores this theme.s0
Section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts from federal in-
come taxation organizations described in section 501(c). Section 501(c)(3)
describes the following organizations:
45 See MNCA, 2oo8, supra note II, § 8.31 cmt., Note on Directors' Liability (2) (stating
that an interested director incurs no liability if one of the procedures of section 8.6o has been
followed); id. cmt. I ("(I f... Section 8.6o shelters the director's conduct in connection with a
conflicting interest transaction, there is no need to consider further the application of Section
8.3I's standards of liability.").
46 See, e.g., PLNO, supra note 3, H§ 3io(b), 33o (setting forth procedures for approving
conflict-of-interest transactions sufficient to avoid a shift in the burden of proving a transac-
tion's fairness to a defendant).
47 Id. § 330 cmt. a(2).
48 See id.
49 Cf Symposium, What is Charity? Implications for Law and Policy, 39 CASE W. REs. L.
REV. 807, 837 (1989). "We have turned to federal tax law to establish the fiduciary duties of
officers and directors. It has been federal tax law by default because the state corporation
statutes have been empty ... . Section 5o therefore imposes the duties for most nonprofit
institutions." Id. (quoting remarks made by Prof. Hansmann during discussion of his paper).
Melanie B. Leslie, The Wisdom ofCrowds? Groupthink andNonprofit Governance, 62 FLA. L. REV.
1179, 1185 (2010) (stating that the Code "requires nonprofits to comply with certain fiduciary
duties as a condition of tax-exempt status").
So The approach of this section, which identifies commonalities in the state law duty
of loyalty and fundamental exemption requirements, is similar to the approach set forth in
a forthcoming article by Professor Dana Brakman Reiser. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Charity
Law' Essentials, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2o1) (analyzing state laws and the fun-
damental exemption requirements discussed in this paper as imposing an "other-regarding
orientation" on charitable entities).
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Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, [1] orga-
nized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing
for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or
international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activi-
ties involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the pre-
vention of cruelty to children or animals, [2] no part of the net earnings
of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, [3]
no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided
in subsection (h)), and [4] which does not participate in, or intervene in (in-
cluding the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign
on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.s'
This Part explains how the first and second of the statutory require-
ments for qualification under section 501(c)(3)" incorporate duty of loyalty
concepts. For ease of discussion, this Article analyzes these statutory re-
quirements by reference to their articulation under United States Treasury
regulations and federal case law. The Treasury regulations interpret the
first requirement as setting forth both an organizational test and an opera-
tional test." In addition, both the regulations and case law interpret the
first statutory requirement as prohibiting an organization from conferring
excessive private benefit.5 4 The second statutory requirement is simply
known as the prohibition against private inurement of net earnings."
A. Organizational and Operational Tests
Under the organizational test, an entity's charter must limit its purposes
to one or more exempt purposes (i.e., the purposes described in section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code),5 6 and generally must not express-
ly empower it to engage in activities that do not further exempt purposes."
Under the operational test, an entity must engage "primarily in activities
which accomplish" exempt purposes.s An entity fails the test "if more
than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt
purpose."5 9
51 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West Supp. 20oo) (bracketed numbers added for clarity).
52 The duty of loyalty is implicated by the requirements set forth in clauses [iI and [z]
in the text of the preceding paragraph.
53 Treas. Reg. § 1.50 1(c)(3)-I(a) (as amended in 2008).
54 Seid. § I.501(c)(3)-I(d)(I)(ii).
55 Id. § .50(c)( 3)-(C)(2).
56 See id. § 1-50 1(c)(3)-1(b)(i)(i)(A).
57 See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i)(B).
58 Id. § I.5o1(c)(3)-I(c)(I).
59 Id. In addition, the organization must not operate so as to violate the other statutory
requirements for qualifying under section 501(c)(3). See id. § I.501(c)(3)-I(c)(2), (3).
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Of course, whether an organization satisfies the organizational and op-
erational tests hinges in part on the existence of an "exempt purpose." The
statute lists several exempt purposes, with no elaboration.w The Treasury
regulations provide more guidance.6' In addition to reiterating the statuto-
rily designated exempt purposes, the regulations state that the term "chari-
table" in section 501(c)(3) retains "its generally accepted legal sense,"'6 and
is not "limited by the separate enumeration in section 501(c)(3) of other
tax-exempt purposes which may fall within the broad outlines of charity as
developed by judicial decisions."'6 By embracing the judicially developed
"broad outlines of charity," the regulations strongly indicate that common
law concepts of charity are relevant in ascertaining the contours of exempt
purposes.
The United States Supreme Court has not only affirmed this impli-
cation of the regulations, but also expanded the role of the common law
beyond that which is implied in the regulations. In Bob Jones University v.
United States, the Court held that an organization claiming exemption from
federal income taxation under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code must not have a purpose that is illegal or that violates "established
public policy."' The Court grounded its analysis on the understanding
that an organization's entitlement to federal income tax exemption under
section 501(c)(3) depends upon whether it satisfies common law concepts
of charity.6 5 The Court reasoned that section 501(c)(3) must be construed
within the Code's "framework" and "against the background of the Con-
gressional purposes."" Identifying parallels between sections 501(c)(3) and
170(c) 6 7 and observing that section 170 authorizes a deduction for "charita-
ble contributions," the Bob Jones Court discerned a congressional intent to
provide tax benefits to organizations serving charitable purposes.' Accord-
ing to the Court, Congress exempted organizations described in section
501(c)(3) from income tax to promote "charitable" organizations because
6o See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West Supp. 2oo).
61 See Treas. Reg. § i.501(c)(3)-i(d) (as amended in 2008).
62 Id. § i.501(c)(3)-i(d)(2).
63 Id. (original emphasis omitted).
64 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591, 595-96 (1983) (holding that two
schools maintaining racially discriminatory policies as to students violated established public
policy).
65 See id. at 586, 588-89.
66 Id. at 586.
67 United States Internal Revenue Code section 170(a)(1) authorizes a deduction for
a "charitable contribution," which is defined in section 170(c). Under section 170(c)(2), a
"charitable contribution" includes a gift to a "corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or
foundation" that satisfies certain requirements. Such requirements include those set forth in
section 50(c)(3). See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(A)-(D) (West Supp. 2010).
68 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 586-88.
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they serve a salutary public purpose.' Consistent with the common law,
Bob Jones concluded that "an institution seeking tax-exempt status must
serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established public policy." 0
The organizational and operational tests, textured by BobJones Universi-
ty's overlay of the common law of charity upon all section 501(c)(3) entities,
may be understood, at a very basic level, to advance essentially the same
goal that inheres in a charity board's fiduciary duties, including the duty of
loyalty. To require a charity to be formed and primarily operated for chari-
table purposes is to forbid it from advancing non-charitable purposes (other
than, perhaps, those other purposes that are inevitably furthered concur-
rently with charitable purposes) to any significant degree. Like any other
corporate entity or trust, a charity acts through people. Because a charity
acts through agents who ultimately answer to the governing board," the
operational test strongly encourages a governing board to ensure that the
charity fulfills the charitable mission for which it is organized, rather than
other purposes. The operational test thereby prods board members to do
that which they are already required to do in exercising their fiduciary du-
ties, including the duty of loyalty.
This point is readily discernable when one compares the operational
test with the duty of loyalty articulated in PLNO. Section 310 of PLNO
states, in relevant part, that the duty of loyalty requires each member of
the charity's governing board "to act in a manner that he or she reason-
ably believes to be in the best interests of the charity, in light of its stated
purposes."n The initial comment to this section notes that the trustee of
a charitable trust owes fiduciary duties "to the charitable purpose" of the
trust." Indeed, under the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, the duty of loy-
alty generally requires a trustee of a charitable trust to administer it "solely
in furtherance of its charitable purpose."" In the corporate context, a direc-
tor owes duties to the entity itself." Consistent with these hornbook rules,
69 Id. at 587-88 ("Congress sought to provide tax benefits to charitable organizations,
to encourage the development of private institutions that serve a useful public purpose or
supplement or take the place of public institutions of the same kind.").
70 Id. at 586.
71 See PLNO, supra note 3, § 32o(a) ("All powers of the charity are exercised by or under
the authority of its governing board, and the activities and affairs of the charity are managed
by, or under the direction and subject to the oversight of, the governing board . . . ."); id. §
32o(b)(i) (stating that the governing board is responsible for monitoring implementation of
the charity's purposes); id. § 3 2o(b)( 3 ) (stating that the governing board is responsible for
monitoring the chief executive's performance).
72 PLNO, supra note 3, § 3 10(a).
73 Id. §3ioemt.a().
74 RESTATEMENT (ThIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(I) (2007). Similarly, under the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS, a trustee must administer the trust "solely in the interest of effectuat-
ing the [trust's] charitable purposes." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 379 cmt. a (1959).
75 PLNO,supra note 3, § 310 cmt. a(r).
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the comments to section 310 of PLNO state that its formulation of the
duty of loyalty "combines the trust and corporate language to declare an
affirmative obligation of the fiduciaries to govern for charitable purposes."7
Requiring a charity's board to govern for the entity's charitable purposes
is, of course, to require the board to govern the charity in a manner that
satisfies the operational test of the Treasury regulations. In other words, the
operational test of the Treasury regulations may be viewed as an effort to condition
tax exemption upon the realization of charitable outcomes that are expected when a
charity ' governing boardfaithfully discharges its fiduciary duties generally, and the
duty of loyalty paricularly.
Admittedly, directors' compliance with the duty of loyalty does not
guarantee satisfaction of the operational test. It is possible that an entity
will fail the operational test, notwithstanding that the governing board has
discharged its duty of loyalty, because the board failed to exercise its duty
of care.n It is also possible that the board could properly discharge all of its
fiduciary duties, but, through neglect or fraud, the officers or employees of
the entity cause it to violate the operational test. Further, it is possible that
an entity could comply with the operational test even if a member of its
governing board breaches her duty of loyalty. 8 Nonetheless, the substance
76 Id. (emphasis added).
77 PLNO describes the duty of care as follows: "The duty of care requires each gov-
erning-board member-(a) to become appropriately informed about issues requiring consid-
eration, and to devote appropriate attention to oversight; and (b) to act with the care that
an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably exercise in a like position and under similar
circumstances." PLNO, supra note 3, § 315. For state statutory expressions of the duty of care,
see, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 523 1(a) (West Supp. 2010) (requiring a director to act "with such
care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use
under similar circumstances"); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. i8o, § 6C (LexisNexis 2oo5) (requiring a
director to act "with such care as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position with respect
to a similar corporation organized under this chapter would use under similar circumstances");
MicH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 450.2541 (West Supp. 2010) (stating that a director must discharge
her duties "with the degree of diligence, care, and skill that an ordinarily prudent person
would exercise under similar circumstances in a like position"); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP.
LAW § 717(a) (McKinney 2005) (imposing an essentially similar standard); Oio REV. CODE
ANN. § 17o2.3o(B) (LexisNexis 2009) (stating that a director must act "with the care that an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances"); 15 PA.
CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5712(a) (West 1995) (requiring a director to exercise "reasonable inquiry,
skill and diligence, as a person of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances");
TEx. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 22.221(a) (West 2009) (requiring a director to act "with ordinary
care").
78 For example, a director might vote in favor of several program initiatives recom-
mended by the charity's chief executive officer because the director wants to receive some
benefit from the executive in return for her vote, notwithstanding that the director believes
the program initiatives will not advance the charity's mission. If, contrary to the belief of the
director, the program initiatives actually appropriately carry out the charity's exempt purposes,
the charity would not fail the operational test. Although these and other examples can be
imagined, the general correspondence between the effective discharge of the duty of loyalty
by directors and the satisfaction of the operational test remains.
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of the operational test is the end sought to be realized through fulfillment
of the duty of loyalty. Moreover, a charity with a board that fulfills its duty
of loyalty is far more likely to operate in accordance with its exempt pur-
poses than one governed by a board that does not. At a minimum, the op-
erational test may be understood as a federalization of the goal sought to be
achieved through the law's imposition of a duty of loyalty on charity fidu-
ciaries and an effort to incentivize the discharge of fiduciary duties by those
who govern tax-exempt charities. Under this view, the most fundamental
requirement of tax exemption for charities complements, and reinforces
the primacy of, a charity fiduciary's duty of loyalty.
B. Prohibition Against Excessive Private Benefit
Under the Treasury regulations, an organization fails to satisfy the or-
ganizational and operational tests unless it serves a public rather than a
private interest. 9 This means that the entity must "establish that it is not
organized or operated for the benefit of private interests such as designated
individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the organization, or
persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests."' The
language of the regulations has produced a doctrine related to, but theoreti-
cally distinct from, the private inurement prohibition discussed infra. The
doctrine is the prohibition against unlawful private benefit, or the "private
benefit doctrine.""
Applying this doctrine, the United States Tax Court has held that an
organization fails to qualify for income tax exemption when it benefits
private interests more than insubstantially, relative to the general public
benefits conferred thereby." For obvious reasons, a judge cannot apply the
test entirely objectively. Even more subjective is the approach of the IRS,
which considers a private benefit "incidental" only if it is incidental both
quantitatively and qualitatively." According to the IRS, a private benefit is
79 See Treas. Reg. § 1.5o1(c)(3)-1(d)(I)(ii) (as amended in 2008).
8o Id.
81 See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 599-6o (9th ed.
2007) (original emphasis omitted) (discussing the private benefit doctrine and observing that
the doctrine is distinct from, yet to some extent subsumes, the private inurement doctrine).
82 See Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1o67-79 (1989) (holding that an
organization that trained people for careers in political campaigning substantially benefited
private interests (the Republican party and its candidates) and therefore failed to qualify as a
tax-exempt educational organization).
83 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 (Dec. IS, 1978). In this General Counsel
Memorandum, the IRS opined that the leasing of land by a hospital to members of its medi-
cal staff for $ i.oo per year would give rise to more than incidental private benefit when the
land could have been leased to the doctors at fair market value, and the benefit to the doctors
was almost as great as the benefit to the public. Similarly, in General Counsel Memoranda
39,498, discussed infra note 84, the IRS concluded that a salary income guarantee may fail
scrutiny under the private benefit doctrine. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,498 (Apr. 24, 1986).
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quantitatively incidental only if it is not substantial in view of the overall
public benefit conferred by the activity. A benefit is qualitatively incidental
only if the benefit is a necessary concomitant of the activity benefitting the
public (i.e., the public can benefit only if certain private individuals also
benefit)."
Thus, an organization that advances plainly charitable purposes may
forfeit federal income tax exemption by conferring certain benefits upon
private parties. Under the private benefit doctrine, a charitable organization
will sacrifice its exemption if it confers a benefit upon any private party
(even someone who lacks an ongoing relationship with the charity) that,
relative to the overall public benefits provided by the charity, is not merely
incidental.
Like the operational test, the private benefit doctrine also compels a
result demanded by the duty of loyalty governing charity fiduciaries. To
require a fiduciary to act in the best interests of a charity is obviously to
forbid her from seeking to advance the best interests of others. In language
strikingly similar to the language of the Treasury regulations cited above,"
the comments to PLNO section 310 state that the duty of loyalty not only
requires fiduciaries "to govern for charitable purposes," but also requires
them not to govern "for the benefit of board members, executives, donors,
or other private parties." 6 In other words, the duty of loyalty requires char-
ity fiduciaries to govern their charities so as not to violate the content of the
private benefit doctrine under federal income tax law. Once again, as in the
case of the operational test, the private benefit doctrine of federal income
tax law embraces the end to which the duty of loyalty aims and incentiv-
izes the discharge of the duty of loyalty by those who govern tax-exempt
charities. Hence, the private benefit doctrine, like the operational test in
general, complements, and reinforces the primacy of, a charity fiduciary's
duty of loyalty.
C. Prohibition Against Private Inurement of Net Earnings
An organization is not described in section 501(c)(3) if its net earn-
ings"' "inure in whole or in part to the benefit of private shareholders or
In applying the "qualitative" test of incidental private benefit, the IRS lacked sufficient facts
to determine whether an income guarantee was the sole means that a hospital could use to
recruit a physician practicing in a field of medical specialization in order to enable the hospi-
tal to provide excellent health care services. Further, because the subsidies to the recruited
physician were not capped (except by a total income guarantee), the contemplated financial
incentives may not have been quantitatively incidental to the hospital's attempt to further
exempt purposes. Id.
84 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,498 (Apr. 24, 1986).
85 See supra note 8o and accompanying text.
86 PLNO,supra note 3, § 310 cmt. a(r).
87 The phrase "net earnings" is misleading, for private inurement may be found even
20IO-20II11 659
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
individuals.""8 This prohibition against the use of a charity's earnings for
private gain is known as the private inurement doctrine,89 and it is distinct
from the private benefit doctrine in at least two respects. First, the private
inurement prohibition is triggered only when certain private persons re-
ceive benefits from a charity. Under Treasury Regulation 1.501(a)-1(c), a
"private shareholder or individual" is someone "having a personal and pri-
vate interest in the activities of the organization."" Case law supports the
conclusion that a person generally has such an interest only if she can exert
control over the charity's operations, although whether such control must
be formal is not a settled issue.9 ' Under this approach, the class of people
who may receive benefits from a charity in violation of the private inure-
ment doctrine is, to some degree, limited because the number of persons
able to control the operations of a charitable organization is finite. Conse-
quently, the prohibition against private inurement of net earnings is not
implicated in many transactions that bestow benefits upon persons unaf-
filiated with a charity.
The second distinction between the prohibition against private inure-
ment and the private benefit doctrine is that the former applies when any
portion of "net earnings" inures to the benefit of an insider. There is no de
minimis safe harbor under the statute. By contrast, the bestowal of an "in-
cidental" private benefit does not disqualify an organization from section
501(c)(3) under the private benefit doctrine.
when the charity does not make a distribution of profits to a private person. The private
inurement doctrine essentially condemns transactions between a charitable organization and
a controlling insider whenever the charitable entity receives less than fair consideration for
what it provides the private individual. See HOPKINS, supra note 81, at 561-64 (discussing the
essence of private inurement and the meaning of "net earnings").
88 See Treas. Reg. § I.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (as amended in 2oo8).
89 See HOPKINS, supra note 8I, at 559-63 (discussing the private inurement doctrine).
90 Treas. Reg. § 1.5o1(a)-i(c) (as amended in 1982) (emphasis omitted).
91 Compare United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1178-79 (7th Cir.
1999) (finding no private inurement when a professional fundraising firm that dominated a
charitable entity could not formally control it), with Variety Club Tent No. 6 Charities, Inc.
v. Comm'r, 74.TC.M. (CCH) 1485 (1997) (finding that a person had the requisite private
interest in a charity when he had a significant voice in its operations and formal and informal
control over much of its income). The IRS's concept of the degree of "control" necessary to
render a person a "private shareholder or individual" with respect to a charity appears to have
evolved somewhat in recent years. To illustrate, in 1986 the IRS opined that physicians have
a personal and private interest in the activities of a hospital (i.e., that physicians constitute
"private shareholders or individuals") if they are employees of the hospital or have a close
working relationship with the hospital (such as staff physicians). I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem.
39,498 (Apr. 14, 1986). But the IRS now appears to recognize that a staff physician is not nec-
essarily a "private shareholder or individual" with respect to an exempt hospital if she does
not have substantial influence over its affairs. See Rev. Rul. 97-2 1, 1997-I C.B. 12 1. See generally
HOPKINS, supra note 8I, at 564-69 (discussing who qualifies as an "insider" for purposes of the
prohibition against private inurement).
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To an even greater degree than the operational test and the private ben-
efit doctrine, the prohibition against private inurement corresponds to the
duty of loyalty governing charity fiduciaries. First, the prohibition against
private inurement extends to those who have some degree of control over
a charity's operations. Plainly, a charity's governing board falls within the
class of controllers; indeed, it, along with senior officers, probably presents
the clearest case of those with a "personal and private interest" in the char-
ity. Second, the prohibition against private inurement forbids conferring a
financial benefit upon an insider, such as a director or trustee, to the detri-
ment of a charity. Case law is replete with examples of private inurement
involving transactions in which a charity receives inadequate consideration
for whatever benefit it provides." The procedural safeguards that board
members are encouraged to follow by modern statutes93 in order to en-
sure compliance with the duty of loyalty are designed to prevent the very
type of financial exploitation of charities that would violate the prohibition
against private inurement. If these procedural safeguards are not followed,
the interested director of a nonprofit corporation must establish the fair-
ness of the transaction to the charity.' PLNO would extend the same rule
to all governing charity fiduciaries, even trustees of charitable trusts.95 Re-
quiring that the transaction be fair to a charity and in its best interest, of
course, is tantamount to requiring that the transaction not result in private
inurement of the charity's net earnings.
Thus, the prohibition against private inurement in important respects
largely subsumes the duty of loyalty. When a charity violates the prohibi-
tion against private inurement, the violation will often be explained by a
breach of the duty of loyalty. Certainly, one can imagine situations when
private inurement results from the breach of the duty of care, rather than
the breach of the duty of loyalty." However, in many contexts a breach of
the duty of loyalty will best explain why private inurement has occurred.
92 See, e.g., Mabee Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 203 E2d 872,875-77 (5th Cir. 1953)
(payment of excessive compensation to insider); Founding Church of Scientology v. United
States, 412 F.ad 1197, 1202 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cerr. denied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1970) (payment of exces-
sive rent to insider). See HOPKINS, supra note 81, at 562 ("[Tlhe private inurement doctrine
requires that these transactions [between a charity and insiders] be tested against a standard
of reasonableness.").
93 See, e.g., MNCA, 2008, supra note I I, § 8.6o(a).
94 See, e.g., 805 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 1o5/Io8.6o(a) (West 2010) (stating that a self-dealing
transaction is not voidable if it is "fair" to the corporation); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW §
715(b) (McKinney zoo5) (same if "fair and reasonable"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1702.301(A)
(I)(c) (LexisNexis 2009) (same if "fair"); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5728(a)(3) (West 1995)
(same); TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 22.23o(b)(2) (West 2010) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
871A.3 (Supp. zoio) (same); MNCA, 2008, supra note I I, § 8.6o(a)(3) (same).
95 See PLNO, supra note 3, § 375(b).
96 For example, the board could negligently approve the sale of charitable assets for a
below-market price to an insider who is not a fiduciary, such as a founder who does not serve
as a director or officer but who nonetheless has great influence over the board.
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By requiring the charity to receive a "fair deal" in transactions with insid-
ers, the prohibition against private inurement all but commands charity
fiduciaries to properly exercise their duty of loyalty.
III. THE FEDERALIZATION OF THE DUTY OF LOYALTY ThROUGH THE FEDERAL
EXCISE TAX REGIME
This Part of the Article discusses the federalization of the duty of loyalty
through the labyrinthine federal excise tax regime governing charities. 7
After briefly discussing four major types of charitable entities or entity
components (private foundations, unaffiliated public charities, supporting
organizations, and donor-advised funds), the Article surveys the excise tax
regime governing various conflict-of-interest transactions involving each
type of entity. Part III then observes that numerous disparate standards and
rules pertaining to the duty of loyalty emerge from the excise tax regime-
supra-trustee standards, trustee standards, and nonprofit-corporate-director
standards, including procedural fairness rules.
A. General Classification of Charitable Entities
Section 509 classifies charitable entities according to their sources of
support, their affiliation with other charities, and, in a few cases, the nature
of their operations. A charity is classified as a private foundation if one
of the subsections of section 509(a) does not describe it.9 ' The following
discussion briefly describes the major types of charities.'
97 1 am not the first to recognize that the federal excise tax regime establishes fiduciary
standards for charity managers. Over two decades ago, Henry Hansmann spoke of the "ex-
tensive corporation statute for private foundations under the private foundation provisions"
of the Code, and opined that "the tax code's private foundation rules are a bad model upon
which to base corporate-law fiduciary duties." Sympoisum, supra note 49, at 838 (quoting re-
marks made by Prof. Hansmann during discussion of his paper). Similarly, Marion Freemont-
Smith has written that the private foundation excise tax regime incorporates in the Code
"standards of behavior for fiduciaries developed under the common law to assure loyalty
and prevent recklessness in the handling of charitable assets." MARION R. FREEMONT-SMITH,
GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 114 (2004);
see also Helge,supra note 2, at 19(referring to the "development of the IRS as federal regulator
of the fiduciary duties of managers of charitable organizations").
98 See I.R.C. § So9(a) (West Supp. 2010) (opening sentence).
99 The classification system and discussion appearing in Part III.A is substantially similar
to that set forth in two prior papers. Johnny Rex Buckles, Fiduciary Assumptions Underlying the
Federal Excise Taxation of Compensation Paid by CAarities, 45 REAL PROP. PROB. & 'R. J. 53, 58-62
(2010) [hereinafter Buckles, Fiduciary Assumptions]; Johnny Rex Buckles, Should the Private
Foundation Excise Tax on Failure to Distribute Income Generally Apply to "Private Foundation
Substitutes"? Evaluating the Taxation of Various Models of Charitable Entities, 44 NEw ENG. L. REV.
493,498-503 (2010).
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1. Unaffiliated Public C/arities.-A tax-exempt charity described in section
509(a)(1) or 509(a)(2) is fairly described as an "unaffiliated public charity."'"
These organizations include several familiar types. They first include
traditional public charities-churches, primary and secondary schools,
colleges, universities, hospitals, and certain medical research organizations
affiliated with hospitals-which derive their non-private foundation status
by virtue of their operations, rather than their sources of funding.01 Other
types of charities qualify as unaffiliated public charities because of their
sources of funding. One type includes any organization that normally
receives a substantial portion of its total support-exclusive of income
received in performing its tax-exempt function-from a governmental unit
or from direct or indirect contributions from a broad segment of the general
public.10 Another type of unaffiliated public charity is one that does not
normally receive more than one-third of its total support from unrelated
business activities and investments and normally receives more than one-
third of its total support from any combination of gifts, grants, membership
fees, and income from performing an exempt function.0
2. Supporting Organizations.-Another type of charity classified as other than
a private foundation is a supporting organization ("SO"). An SO maintains
a formal relationship with another charity, akin to a subsidiary/parent or
brother/sister relationship between for-profit corporations. 10 An SO must
satisfy three requirements. First, the SO must be organized and operated
solely "for the benefit of, to perform the functions of, or to carry out the
purposes of" a section 509(a)(1) or 509(a)(2) entity (hereinafter referred to
as a "supported organization"). 0 o Second, the SO must satisfy one of three
alternative statutory requirements ensuring that the supported organization
controls the SO, or that the two entities share common
1oo Although an entity described in paragraph (I) or (2) of section 509(a) may in fact
have a formal affiliation with another charity, that affiliation is not essential to the entity's
classification as other than a private foundation. Hence, the term "unaffiliated public charity"
in this Article refers to any organization described in section 5o9(a)(I) or (2), regardless of its
relationship to another charity. See I.R.C. § 509(a)(I)-(2) (West Supp. 2010).
ioi See I.R.C. § 17 o(b)(i)(A)(i)-(iii) (West Supp. 2010).
102 See id. §§ 170(b)(1)(A)(vi), 509(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e) (as amended in 2008)
(setting forth two alternative tests for qualifying as a publicly supported organization).
103 See I.R.C. § 5o9(a)(2) (West Supp. 20o). For these purposes, qualifying support does
not include receipts from certain insiders of the charity or from non-publicly supported chari-
ties. See id. § 5 09 (a)(2)(A).
104 See Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(g)(I)(i) (as amended in 1981); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 109TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4, THE "PENSION PROTECTION ACT
OF 2006," As PASSED BY THE HOUSE ON JULY 28, 2006, AND AS CONSIDERED BY THE SENATE ON
AUGUST 3, 2006, at 331-32 (Comm. Print 2006).
105 I.R.C. § 5 09(a)(3)(A) (West Supp. 2010).
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supervision or complementary operations.'" These requirements give rise
to the classification of an SO as a "Type I," "Type II," or "Type III" SO in
common nomenclature. Finally, designated insiders, including large donors
and their family members, must not control the SO.10
3. Private Foundations.-A tax-exempt entity described in section 501(c)(3)
that is neither an SO nor one of the various types of unaffiliated public
charities discussed in Part III.A.1 is classified as a private foundation.10
Typically, a single large donor or small group of donors (such as an
individual, couple, family, or corporation) primarily or exclusively funds a
private foundation.'os
4. Donor Advised Funds.-A donor-advised fund ("DAF") is, strictly
speaking, a component of a charity, rather than a distinct legal entity
organized for charitable purposes. However, transactions involving a DAF
are subject to special excise tax rules that practically require analysis of
a DAF as though it were a charitable entity for some purposes of federal
tax law. Subject to narrow exceptions,"10 a DAF is a fund or account that
meets the following four requirements. First, the charity that sponsors the
fund must separately identify it "by reference to contributions of a donor
or donors."'" Second, the sponsoring charity must own and control the
fund."' Third, by reason of her status as a donor, the donor of the fund, or
her designee, must have advisory privileges with respect to the distribution
or investment of fund assets."' Finally, the charity sponsoring the DAF
must not be a private foundation." 4
io6 See id. § 5o9(a)(3)(B) (West Supp. 2oo); Treas. Reg. § I.5o9(a)-4(f)(2)(i)-(ii) (as
amended in 1981).
107 See I.R.C. § 509(a)(3)(C) (West Supp. 2010); id. § 4946 (zoo6).
Io8 See id. § 509(a) (West Supp. 2010).
io9 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF
H.R. 4, THE "PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2oo6," As PASSED BY THE HOUSE ON JULY 28, 20o6,
AND AS CONSIDERED BY THE SENATE ON AUGUST 3, 2oo6, at 335 (Comm. Print 2oo6).
I10 See I.R.C. § 4 9 66(d)(2)(B)(i)-(iii) (West Supp. 2010) (excepting from the definition of
a DAF those funds that distribute money only to a single entity and those from which money
may be distributed only for certain education-related grants upon the recommendation of a
committee appointed by the sponsoring organization).
III Id. § 4966(d)(2)(A)(i).
I12 Id. § 49 66(d)(2)(A)(ii).
1 13 Id. § 4966(d)(2)(A)(iii).
114 Id. § 4966(d)(i)(B) (defining "sponsoring organization" to exclude a private founda-
tion). The definitional requirements of a DAF do not imply that a private foundation is pro-
hibited from soliciting funds and holding them in separate accounts. Rather, any such account
would simply not meet the definition of a DAF
664 [Vol. 99
FEDERALIZATION OF DUTY OF LOYALTY
B. How the Federal Excise Tax Regime Regulates Common Conflict-of-Interest
Transactions Involving the Four Types of Charitable Entities
1. Compensation of Insiders.-
a. Private Foundations
A federal self-dealing excise tax effectively prohibits most transactions
between a private foundation and a "disqualified person" with respect to
the foundation.11 s A disqualified person includes an officer or director of
the private foundation,"'6 any substantial contributor to the foundation,"'
a member of the family of the foregoing,"' and entities in which any of
the foregoing hold an ownership interest exceeding thirty-five percent."'
A "substantial contributor" to a private foundation is, in general, someone
who has given more than $5,000 to the foundation, if her cumulative gifts
exceed two percent of total gifts received by the foundation through the
close of the year in which the contributor has made gifts to the foundation.'20
Thus, fiduciaries, large donors, and their family members are all subject to
the private foundation excise tax on acts of self-dealing.
The payment to a disqualified person of compensation for "non-
personal" services, like most conflict-of-interest transactions involving
a private foundation, is taxable as an act of self-dealing.'"' Similarly, the
payment of excessive compensation to a disqualified person for any type of
service is an act of self-dealing."' However, a private foundation's payment
of non-excessive compensation to a disqualified person for personal
services which are reasonable and necessary to carry out the foundation's
exempt purposes is not taxable."' The category of "personal services"
has been defined as services of a "professional and managerial" nature."'
115 See id. § 4941(d)(1).
I6 Id. § 4946(a)(I)(B), (b)(I) (2006).
I17 Id. § 4946(a)(i)(A) (2oo6). A disqualified person also includes one whose ownership
interest in a substantial contributor exceeds twenty percent, id § 4946(a)(i)(C), and a member
of the family of any such owner. I.R.C. § 4946(a)(i)(D).
I18 I.R.C. § 4946(a)(I)(D).
119 Id. § 4946(a)(I)(E)-(G).
120 Id. §§ 507(d)(2)(A), 4946(a)(2).
121 See id. § 4 941(d)(i)(D) (West Supp. 2010).
122 See id.
123 See id § 4941(d)(2)(E).
124 Madden v. Comm'r, 74 TC.M. (CCH) 440, 449 (1997); see also Rev. Rul. 74-591,
1974-2 C.B. 385 (ruling that the payment of a pension to a disqualified person was not an act
of self-dealing when his personal services consisted of general administration, bookkeeping,
investment counseling, disbursing funds, and managing real estate).
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They include brokerage,"zs legal,'16 investment counseling,' and general
banking services.' Moreover, members of the governing board of a private
foundation may receive reasonable compensation for attending board
meetings.2 9
If the payment of compensation is an act of self-dealing under these
rules, a tax is generally imposed both on the self-dealer'3 0 (i.e., the
compensated disqualified person) and any foundation manager (including
a board member) who knowingly participated in the decision to pay the
compensation."' No tax is imposed on the private foundation itself. A
disqualified person who receives compensation in an act of self-dealing
cannot avoid taxation by proving her good faith or her reasonable belief that
the transaction is entirely fair to the foundation."' In contrast, a foundation
manager is liable for paying the excise tax imposed on management if her
participation in the decision to cause the foundation to engage in the act
of self-dealing involves "knowing" 3 that a self-dealing transaction exists,
unless her participation "is not willful and is due to reasonable cause.""
125 Treas. Reg. § 53-4941(d)-3(c)(1) (as amended in 1984).
I26 Id. § 53-4941(d)-3(c)(2) ex. I.
127 Id. § 53-4941(d)-3(c)(2) ex. 2.
128 Id. § 53-4 941(d)-2(c)( 4 ), (d)-3(c)(2) ex. 3.
129 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-08-oo (Oct. 24, 1989) (determining the amount of
reasonable directors' fees and concluding that some payments were excessive and constituted
acts of self-dealing). More generally, the IRS has privately ruled that self-dealing does not
include the payment of reasonable trustees' fees. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-35-047
(June 7, 2001); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 82-26-149 (Apr. 5, 1982).
130 I.R.C. § 4941(a)(I), (b)(i) (West Supp. 2010).
131 Id §4941(a)(2), (b)(2).
132 See Madden v. Comm'r, 74 TC.M. (CCH) 44o, 449 (1997) (imposing an excise tax
on a disqualified person notwithstanding that the compensation for its services was at the
market price).
133 United States Treasury regulations provide the following definition of "knowing":
For purposes of section 4941, a person shall be considered to have
participated in a transaction "knowing" that it is an act of self-dealing
only if:
(i) He has actual knowledge of sufficient facts so that, based solely
upon such facts, such transaction would be an act of self-dealing,
(ii) He is aware that such an act under these circumstances may
violate the provisions of Federal tax law governing self-dealing, and
(iii) He negligently fails to make reasonable attempts to ascertain
whether the transaction is an act of self-dealing, or he is in fact aware
that it is such an act.
Treas. Reg. § 53-4941(a)-I(b)(3) (as amended in 1973).
134 I.R.C. § 494i(a)(2) (West Supp. 20o0). The Treasury regulations appear to alter the
statutory test slightly. Under the regulations, a foundation manager who knows that an act is
an act of self-dealing is liable for payment of the tax on management only if her participation
in the transaction "is willful and is not due to reasonable cause." Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(a)-i(b)
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A manager generally escapes liability if her conclusion that no self-
dealing occurred was based upon a reasoned, written opinion provided by
competent legal counsel," or if she otherwise exercised ordinary business
care in determining that a transaction is not taxable self-dealing.1 16
b. Unaffiliated Public Charities
No federal excise tax applies to an unaffiliated public charity's
payment of reasonable compensation' 7 to a disqualified person,"' such
as a member of its board of directors or anyone else who can exercise
substantial influence over the charity's operations.'39 Thus, in the case
of an unaffiliated public charity, no distinction between "personal" and
"non-personal" services is of import. If a public charity pays excessive
compensation to a disqualified person, the amount exceeding reasonable
compensation is subject to section 4958's excess benefit transactions excise
tax, or "EBTET".'4 A tax is generally imposed both on the disqualified
person 4 1 who receives the excess benefit and any manager (e.g., a director
or officer) who participates in the decision to cause the charity to enter into
the excess benefit transaction.142
(s)(iii) (as amended in 1973).
135 Treas. Reg. § 53-4941(a)-I(b)(6) (as amended 1973).
136 Id § 53.4941(a)-i(b)(5).
137 Reasonable compensation is the amount that would ordinarily be paid for like servic-
es by like enterprises under like circumstances. Id. § 53-4958-4(b)(1)(ii)(A) (2002). Standards
for determining reasonableness (in the context of taxable trades and businesses) under sec-
tion 162 apply for these purposes. Id.
138 In the context of an unaffiliated public charity, the term "disqualified person" means
any person who, within the five years preceding the transaction at issue, was "in a position to
exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the organization," as well as members of his
family and certain affiliated entities. I.R.C. § 4958(f)(i) (West Supp. 2010).
139 A voting member of the board of directors is deemed to exercise substantial influ-
ence over the affairs of the charity, and therefore is a "disqualified person." See Treas. Reg. §
53.4958-3(c)(1) (2002).
14o An "excess benefit transaction" is
any transaction in which an economic benefit is provided by an ap-
plicable tax-exempt organization directly or indirectly to or for the use
of any disqualified person if the value of the economic benefit provided
exceeds the value of the consideration (including the performance of
services) received for providing such benefit.
I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2oo).
141 A first-tier tax equal to 25% of the excess benefit is first imposed on the disqualified
person. Id. § 4958(a)(I). A second-tier tax equal to 200% of the excess benefit is imposed on
the disqualified person if the excess benefit is not corrected within a certain time period. Id.
§ 4958(b).
142 The tax on management equals ten percent of the excess benefit. Id. § 4958(a)(2).
This tax is limited to a maximum of $20,000. Id. § 4958(d)(2). Congress enacted the EBTET
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Although section 4958 does not relieve an over-compensated
disqualified person from excise tax liability merely because she acted in
good faith or with the reasonable belief that her compensation is entirely
fair, both an interested disqualified person and disinterested directors may
benefit from a rebuttable presumption that the compensatory arrangement
is reasonable if certain procedures are followed. By Treasury regulation,
payments of compensation are presumed to be reasonable under the
following three conditions:
(1) An authorized body comprised entirely of disinterested fiduciaries of
the charity approved the compensation arrangement in advance of payment;
(2) The body of fiduciaries obtained and relied upon appropriate
comparability data before deciding upon the compensatory arrangement;
and
(3) In deciding upon the compensatory arrangement, the body of
fiduciaries adequately and concurrently documented the basis for its
decision.143
When these three conditions are satisfied, the IRS can rebut the presumption
of reasonableness only by developing contrary evidence based on facts
existing on the effective date of the compensatory arrangement.'"
Additional protections are available to disinterested fiduciaries who
approve conflict-of-interest transactions. Disinterested managers are
subject to excise tax only when they participate in an excess benefit
transaction while "knowing that it is such," and they escape liability
when their participation "is not willful and is due to reasonable cause."l 45
"Knowing" participation in an excess benefit transaction ordinarily does
primarily to enable the IRS to penalize a charity's insiders for violating the statutory prohibi-
tion against private inurement of a charitable organization's net earnings without revoking
the entity's federal income tax exemption. See Jill S. Manny, Nonprofit Payments to Insiders and
Outsiders: Is the Sky the Limit?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 750-52 (2oo7). Of course, a transaction
subject to the EBTET also generally results in private inurement of a charity's net earnings,
and therefore generally constitutes grounds for revocation of federal income tax exemption.
The Treasury Department has recently published regulations listing factors that the IRS will
consider in determining whether to revoke an entity's tax exemption when it has engaged in
an excess benefit transaction. Treas. Reg. § i.5o(c)(3)-(f)(2)(ii) (as amended in 2008).
For a discussion of the EBTET in the context of the general prohibition against pri-
vate inurement of a tax-exempt charity's net earnings, see Darryll K. Jones, The Scintilla of
Individual Profit: In Search of Private Inurement and Excess Benefit, 19 VA. TAx REV. 575 (2000).
143 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a) (2002). The regulations set forth detailed rules expound-
ing upon these three requirements. See id. § 53.4958-6(c). Similar rules apply in establishing
a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness involving a "transfer of property, or the right to
use property." Id. § 53.4958-6(a). The House Ways and Means Committee recommended the
rebuttable presumption of reasonableness in its report accompanying the enactment of the
EBTET See H.R. REP. No. IO4-5o6, at 56-57 (1996).
144 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(b) (2002). In the case of non-fixed payments, additional facts
existing up to the date of payment are also relevant. Id.
145 I.R.C. § 4958(a)(2) (West Supp. zolo).
668 [Vol. 99
FEDERALIZATION OF DUTY OF LOYALTY
not exist if, after full disclosure to an appropriate professional, the manager
relies on a reasoned written opinion of the professional in approving
the compensatory arrangement."' Additionally, if the governing body
of the charity in question has acted in a manner sufficient to invoke the
rebuttable presumption of reasonableness, a board member ordinarily does
not participate "knowingly" in an excess benefit transaction.'47 Moreover, a
manager who does not know that a compensatory arrangement is an excess
benefit transaction does not act "willfully,"' 48 and her participation is due
to "reasonable cause," if she has acted with ordinary business care and
prudence.149
c. SOs
SOs are subject to the EBTET regime,1s0 which in some respects
applies to them just as it applies to unaffiliated public charities. However,
a few features of the regime, added by the Pension Protection Act of
2006 (the "PPA"),'s' apply to SOs but not unaffiliated charities. Under the
PPA, an excess benefit transaction includes certain transactions between
an SO and particular insiders regardless of whether the transactions are
fairly priced. For example, an excess benefit transaction includes any
compensation provided by an SO to a "substantial contributor"'s or to
certain persons or entities related thereto.s 3 The entire amount of this
compensation is treated as an excess benefit." The EBTET is generally
imposed both on the disqualified person' 5 who receives the excess benefit
146 Treas. Reg. § 53-4958-I(d)(4)(iii) (2002). Reliance on a professional is appropriate
only if the professional is opining on a matter within her expertise. Id. Appropriate profes-
sionals include legal counsel, certified public accountants, and qualified compensation con-
sultants. Id.
147 See id. § 53-4958- 1(d)( 4)(iv).
148 Id. § 53-4958-I(d)(5).
149 Id. § 53.4958-i(d)(6).
150 Like any organization described in section 501 (c)(3) or (c)(4) but not classified as a
private foundation, an SO is an "applicable tax-exempt organization" subject to the EBTET
regime. See I.R.C. § 4958(e) (West Supp. 2010) (defining "applicable tax-exempt organiza-
tion").
151 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, i2o Stat. 78o.
152 A substantial contributor is generally defined as someone who has given more than
$5,ooo to the organization, if her cumulative gifts exceed two percent of total gifts received by
the organization through the close of the year in which the person in question has made gifts
to the organization. I.R.C. § 4958(c)(3)(C)(i) (West Supp. 2010).
153 See id. § 4 958(c)(3)(A)(i)(I), (B)(i)-(iii). Somewhat simplified, the related persons
include members of the substantial contributor's family and business entities in which the
substantial contributor's ownership interest exceeds thirty-five percent. Id. § 4958(c)(3)(B)
(ii, (iii).
154 Id § 4958(c)(3)(A)(ii).
155 Id. § 4958(a)(i), (b).
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and on any manager (e.g., a director or officer of the SO) who participates in
the decision to cause the SO to enter into the excess benefit transaction. 156
d. DAFs
The PPA generally subjects a DAF to the EBTET regime in the case
of transactions involving the DAF and "disqualified persons" with respect
to the fund."' These disqualified persons, referred to herein as "DAF
insiders," include (1) any fund donor who has advisory privileges with
respect to fund distributions or investments by virtue of her status as a
donor;"$ (2) the designee of any such donor;"' (3) a member of the family
of any such donor or designee;"W and (4) any business entity in which the
ownership interest of the foregoing exceeds thirty-five percent. 6'
Although some transactions between a DAF and a DAF insider are taxed
like transactions between a disqualified person and an unaffiliated public
charity,"' the PPA created a special DAF rule akin to a provision applicable
to SOs. Under this rule, an excess benefit transaction includes certain
transactions between the DAF and DAF insiders regardless of whether the
transactions are fairly priced. Specifically, an "'excess benefit transaction'
includes any grant, loan, compensation, or other similar payment" provided
by a DAF to a DAF insider.'" The entire amount of this compensation is
treated as an excess benefit." If compensation is paid to a DAF insider, the
tax under section 4958 is apparently imposed on both the DAF insider and
any director or officer of the sponsoring organization who participates in the
decision to cause the DAF to pay the compensation.
2. Grants to Insiders.-
a. Private Foundations
A grant to a disqualified person quite literally falls within the definition
of taxable self-dealing because it is a "transfer" of a private foundation's
assets to a disqualified person. 65 A grant that constitutes an act of self-
156 Id. § 4958(a)(2).
157 See id. §495 8(f)(I)(E).
158 See id. §§ 4958(f)(7)(A), 4966(d)(2)(A)(iii).
159 See id. §§ 4958(f)(7)(A), 4966(d)(2)(A)(iii).
i6o Id. § 4958(f)(7)(B).
16 I Id. § 4958(f)(7)(C).
162 For example, transactions entered into at the market price are generally not taxed.
163 I.R.C. § 4958(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2oio) (emphasis added).
164 See id. § 4958(c)(2)(B).
165 Id § 4941(d)(i)(E). One should therefore exercise great caution in relying on excep-
tions to the definition of "taxable expenditures" for certain grants to individuals under section
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dealing results in imposition of excise tax on both the self-dealer'" (i.e.,
the disqualified person receiving the grant) and any foundation manager
(including a board member) who knowingly participated in the decision to
make the grant. 16
As with the case of receiving excessive compensation, a disqualified
person who receives a grant in a taxable self-dealing transaction cannot
avoid excise tax liability by proving her good faith or her reasonable belief
that the transaction is not an act of self-dealing. On the other hand, the same
grounds for avoiding liability for excise taxes that are available to foundation
managers in the case of a decision to pay prohibited compensation are
likewise available with respect to disinterested management's decision to
make a grant that constitutes an act of self-dealing. 1
b. Unaffiliated Public Charities
At first glance, a grant by a public charity to a disqualified person seems
to satisfy the statutory definition of an "excess benefit transaction," for it
confers an economic benefit upon a disqualified person without securing
any direct consideration from the disqualified person for the public charity.
However, by Treasury regulation, an economic benefit is disregarded if it is
"provided to a person solely because the person is a member of a charitable
class that the applicable tax-exempt organization intends to benefit as
part of the accomplishment of the organization's exempt purpose." 69
Thus, for example, the making of a scholarship grant by a public charity
with educational purposes to a disqualified person (such as the child of
a member of the charity's governing board) may not constitute an excess
benefit transaction.170
4945(g)(3). That a grant is not a "taxable expenditure" does not insulate it from qualifying as
an act of self-dealing.
166 Id § 4941(a)(i), (b)(i). There is no excise tax imposed on the private foundation
itself.
167 Id. § 4941(a)(2), (b)(2).
168 See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text. Of course, the application of the
rules limiting management's liability for excise taxes differs somewhat when managers have
decided to approve a self-dealing transaction when the "reasonableness" of the terms of
the transaction are irrelevant. For example, whereas managers would be entitled to rely on
competent compensation consultants in determining the amount of compensation to pay the
foundation's president, relying on an outside consultant's opinion as to the "reasonableness"
of the amount of a grant to a disqualified person would not shield management from excise
tax liability.
169 Treas. Reg. § 53-4958-4(a)(4)(v) (2002).
17o The IRS essentially has agreed with this interpretation of the regulations in a private
letter ruling. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-32-018 (May 13, 2003) (indicating that the IRS's
approval of the scholarship program as not producing acts of self-dealing depended in part
on the non-involvement of any "interested" disqualified person in the scholarship selection
process).
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If the grant does not fall under the special rule discussed immediately
above, a tax is generally imposed both on the disqualified person who
receives the excess benefit and any exempt organization manager who
participates in the decision to cause the charity to make the grant. The
governing statutory provisions are those applicable to the payment of
excessive compensation, discussed supra.17' As is the case with respect to
its treatment of excessive compensation, section 4958 does not absolve a
disqualified person who receives a taxable grant from excise tax liability
merely because he acted in good faith or with the reasonable belief that the
transaction was entirely fair to the public charity. Disinterested managers
who participate in the decision to make a taxable grant are subject to excise
tax under the same circumstances in which they incur a tax for authorizing
the payment of excessive compensation."'
c. SOs
The application of the EBTET to SOs in the case of grants is generally
the same as its application to unaffiliated public charities. However, under
a special rule, an excess benefit transaction includes any grant provided by
an SO to a substantial contributor or to certain persons or entities related
to a substantial contributor."' The entire amount of the grant is treated as
an excess benefit.174
d. DAFs
Unlike the excise tax provisions governing any other type of charitable
entity, the Code generally prohibits grants from a DAF to an individual-
whether or not that individual is an insider with respect to the DAF. 7 1
Moreover, and entirely separate from the provision that taxes grants in
general from a DAF (section 4966), a special provision in section 4958
now defines an excess benefit transaction to include "any grant, loan,
compensation, or other similar payment" provided by a DAF to a DAF
insider."' For purposes of the EBTET imposed by section 4958, the entire
171 See supra Part III.B.i.b.
172 I.R.C. § 4958(a)(2) (West Supp. 2oo). The defenses of relying on an appropriate
professional and acting with ordinary care, discussed in supra notes 145-49 and accompanying
text, should apply similarly in the case of grants.
173 I.R.C. § 4958(c)(3)(A)(i)(I), (B)(i)-(iii) (West Supp. zoo).
174 Id. § 4958(c)(3)(A)(ii).
175 See id. § 4966(c)(I)(A) (defining a taxable distribution generally to include any dis-
tribution to a natural person). There are a few exceptions to this general rule. See, e.g., id. §
4 9 66(d)(2)(B)(ii), (C); I.R.S. Notice o6-109, 2006-2 C.B. I I21.
176 I.R.C. § 4958(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2olo) (emphasis added).
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amount of the grant is treated as an excess benefit.'7 Section 4966 contains
no "abdication" provision removing from its application any transaction
resulting in tax under the EBTET of section 4958. Thus, it appears that a
grant to a DAF insider triggers tax under both sections 4958 and 4966.
A section 4966 tax on a taxable distribution from a DAF is imposed on
both the sponsoring organization"' and on a fund manager who agreed to
the distribution while knowing that it is a taxable distribution."' Insofar as
a grant from a DAF to a DAF insider is a de jure excess benefit transaction
under section 4958, both the sponsoring organization's managers"so and the
DAF insider'8' apparently are liable for the EBTET, as well.
3. -Loans to Insiders.-
a. Private Foundations
A loan from a private foundation to a disqualified person constitutes an
act of self-dealing.8 2 In contrast, the lending of money by a disqualified
person to a private foundation is not an act of self-dealing if the loan is
without interest or other charge, and if the proceeds of the loan are used
exclusively for purposes specified in section 501(c)(3). 8 1
As in the case of other self-dealing transactions, a loan that constitutes
self-dealing results in no imposition of excise tax on the private foundation
itself. However, a tax is generally imposed both on the self-dealer'8" (i.e.,
the disqualified person receiving the loan) and any foundation manager
(induding a board member) who knowingly participated in the decision
to make the loan.'15 The grounds (if any) for avoiding liability for the self-
dealing excise tax discussed previously"' apply in the case of loans.
b. Unaffiliated Public Charities
A loan between an unaffiliated public charity and a disqualified person
does not necessarily result in excise tax. The terms of the loan must be
such that the disqualified person does not receive an excess benefit from
177 Id. § 4958(C)(2)(B).
178 Id. § 4966(a)(i).
179 Id. § 4966(a)(2).
i8o Id. § 4958(a)(2).
181 Id. § 4958(a)(i), (b).
182 Id § 4941(d)(1)(B).
183 Id § 4941(d)(2)(B).
184 Id. § 4941(a)(i), (b)(i).
185 Id § 4941(a)(2), (b)(2).
186 See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
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the lending transaction. The general rules of the EBTET regime apply to
loans, as in the case of other conflict-of-interest transactions.
c. SOs
The application of the EBTET regime to SOs in the case of loans dif-
fers greatly from its application to unaffiliated public charities. Two special
rules are extremely important. First, an excess benefit transaction includes
any loan provided by an SO to a substantial contributor or to certain per-
sons or entities related to a substantial contributor.' Second, an excess
benefit transaction includes any loan provided by an SO to any disquali-
fied person (unless, in general, the disqualified person is a publicly sup-
ported charity).' 8 In each case, the entire amount of the loan is treated as
an excess benefit.' The incidence of taxation in the case of loans, and the
grounds for avoiding tax (if any), are the same as in other types of excess
benefit transactions.
d. DAFs
An excess benefit transaction includes any loan provided by a DAF to
a DAF insider.'" For purposes of the EBTET, the entire amount of the
loan is treated as an excess benefit."' If a loan is made to a DAF insider,
apparently the tax under section 4958 is imposed on both the DAF insider
and any manager of the sponsoring organization (i.e., a director or officer)
who participates in the decision to cause the DAF to make the loan.
4. Other Conflict of Interest Transactions.-
a. Private Foundations
Most transactions between a private foundation and a "disqualified
person" with respect to the foundation, including sales and exchanges of
property,192 leases,'19 and other forms of furnishing goods, services, and
facilities,'" are effectively prohibited by the federal self-dealing excise
187 I.R.C. § 4958(c)(3)(A)(i)(I), (B)(i)-(iii) (West Supp. 2010).
188 See id. § 4958(c)(3)(A)(i)(II).
189 Id. § 4958(c)(3 )(A)(ii).
190 Id. § 4958(c)(2)(A).
191 Id. § 4958(C)(2)(B).
192 Id. § 4941(d)(I)(A).
193 Id.
194 Id. § 4941(d)(i)(C).
674 [Vol. 99
FEDERALIZATION OF DUTY OF LOYALTY
tax.'15 Indeed, any "transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a disqualified
person of the income or assets of a private foundation" is an act of self-
dealing.'" Whether the transactions are "fair" to the private foundation is
generally irrelevant. If the self-dealing excise tax applies in the case of
these other conflict-of-interest transactions, the incidence of tax and ability
(or inability) to avoid excise tax liability are determined under the same
rules discussed previously.' 7
b. Unaffiliated Public Charities
Other conflict-of-interest transactions involving an unaffiliated public
charity and a disqualified person present no novel issues. The transactions
must not confer upon a disqualified person any excess benefit from a
related charity. The general rules of the EBTET regime apply to these
conflict-of-interest transactions.198'
c. SOs
Conflict-of-interest transactions between an SO and a disqualified person
that have not been discussed previously in this paper are generally subject
to the EBTET regime. Thus, except in the case of loans to disqualified
persons, grants to substantial contributors and related parties, and payments
of compensation to substantial contributors and related parties, the general
rules of the EBTET regime apply to most transactions between SOs
and disqualified persons. Examples of such transactions include sales of
property, exchanges of property, and leases. Such transactions should not
trigger excise tax if they convey no excess benefit on disqualified persons.
195 Exceptions to the general rule apply in limited circumstances. See, e.g., id. § 494i(d)
(2)(C) ("[Tihe furnishing of goods, services, or facilities by a disqualified person to a private
foundation shall not be an act of self-dealing if the furnishing is without charge and if the
goods, services, or facilities so furnished are used exclusively for purposes specified in section
5o1(c)(3)."); id. § 4941(d)(2)(D) ("[T]he furnishing of goods, services, or facilities by a private
foundation to a disqualified person shall not be an act of self-dealing if such furnishing is made
on a basis no more favorable than that on which such goods, services, or facilities are made
available to the general public."); id. § 4 94 1(d)(2)(F) ("[Alny transaction between a private
foundation" and an incorporated disqualified person "pursuant to any liquidation, merger,
redemption, recapitalization, or other corporate adjustment, organization, or. reorganization"
is not self-dealing "if all of the securities of the same class as that held by the foundation are
subject to the same terms and such terms provide for receipt by the foundation of no less than
fair market value.").
196 Id. § 4941(d)(i)(E).
197 See supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
198 Moreover, rules similar to those applicable to compensation arrangements apply in
establishing a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness involving a "transfer of property, or
the right to use property." Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a)()-(3) (2002).
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However, under a special rule, an excess benefit transaction includes
"any grant, loan, compensation, or other similar payment" provided by an
SO to a substantial contributor or to certain persons or entities related to a
substantial contributor.'" The legislative history of the PPA indicates that
a "similar payment" includes an expense reimbursement.o The entire
amount of the payment is treated as an excess benefit."' The incidence of
taxation in the case of such payments, and the grounds for avoiding tax (if
any), are the same as in other types of excess benefit transactions.
d. DAFs
There are three types of conflict-of-interest transactions between a
DAF and a DAF insider which have not yet been discussed in this paper
that must be identified and analyzed. First, and similar to the rule governing
SOs and substantial contributors, an excess benefit transaction includes
"any grant, loan, compensation, or other similar payment" provided by a
DAF to a DAF insider.0 The legislative history of the PPA indicates that
"similar payments" include an expense reimbursement.z3 For purposes of
the EBTET, the entire amount of the other similar payment is treated as
an excess benefit. 204
A second class of other conflict-of-interest transactions between a DAF
and a DAF insider consists of those which must be analyzed under the
normal section 4958 rules.0 5 These rules, which essentially impose an
objective fair dealing test, apply to transactions between a DAF and a DAF
insider other than a loan to the DAF insider, a grant to the DAF insider,
the payment of compensation to the DAF insider, or a similar payment to
a DAF insider. An example is the purchase of a security held by the DAF
by a DAF insider.
A third class of transactions consists of those governed by section 4967-
a provision that applies apart from the EBTET regime. Under section
4967, a tax is imposed if, upon the advice of a DAF insider, a distribution
from the DAF is made so as to result in that person or any other DAF
insider "receiving, directly or indirectly, a more than incidental benefit as
19 I.R.C. § 4 95 8(c)(3)(A)(i)(I), (B)(i)-(iii) (West Supp. 20 o) (emphasis added).
200 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R.
4, THE "PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006," As PASSED BY THE HOUSE ON JULY 28, 2oo6, AND AS
CONSIDERED BY THE SENATE ON AUGUST 3, 2oo6, at 358 (Comm. Print 2006).
201 Sm I.R.C. § 4958(c)(3)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 2010).
202 Id. § 4958(C)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
203 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, l09TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R.
4, THE "PENSION PROTECTION AcT OF 2006," As PASSED BY THE HOUSE ON JULY 28, 2006, AND AS
CONSIDERED BY THE SENATE ON AUGUST 3, 2oo6, at 347 (Comm. Print 2oo6).
2o4 I.R.C. § 4 95 8(c)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2010).
205 Sa id. § 4958(f)(I)(E).
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a result of such distribution."" A tax under section 4967 is imposed on
any DAF insider who advised as to the distribution,0 any DAF insider
who received a benefit as a result of the distribution,2 0s and on any fund
manager who agreed to the making of a distribution, knowing that the
distribution would confer the benefit.2 0 However, the tax is coordinated
with the EBTET regime; no tax is imposed under section 4967 with
respect to any distribution if a tax has been imposed with respect to such
distribution under section 4958.10
C. Fiduciary Rules and Standards that Inhere in the
Excise Tax Regime Governing Charities
One may discern three types of standards that characterize the federal
excise tax regime's regulation of various conflict-of-interest transactions
involving charity fiduciaries: (1) supra-trustee standards; (2) trustee
standards; and (3) nonprofit-corporate-director standards. This sub-part
explains the meaning of each type and then categorizes the excise tax rules
according to their type.
"Supra-trustee" standards, as used herein, are those subsumed under
various excise tax provisions that regulate fiduciaries more stringently than
does the fiduciary duty of loyalty governing trustees of trusts. As discussed
above, under the law of trusts, the "no further inquiry rule" does not
apply in various situations. For example, a trustee is entitled to receive
reasonable compensation for services performed in administering the
trust. Hence, an excise tax provision effectively prohibiting the payment
of reasonable compensation for necessary services provided by a trustee
is a supra-trustee standard. Likewise, the trust law duty of loyalty does
not subject transactions between a settlor and a trust that he created to
the "no further inquiry rule" as long as the settlor does not also serve as
trustee. Such transactions do not necessarily present a "conflict of interest"
under the common law of trusts. Hence, a tax rule that effectively prohibits
a fiduciary from dealing (on behalf of the charitable entity) with a major
contributor can be conceptualized as a supra-trustee standard.2"
206 Id. § 4967(a)(I).
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id. § 4967(a)(2).
210 Id.§4967(b).
211 Actually, insofar as the law of trusts permits a settlor to alter the no-further-inquiry
rule by the terms of trust, any excise tax provision that categorically prohibits a transaction be-
tween a charitable organization and its governing fiduciaries is in some sense a supra-trustee
standard. However, because no excise tax provision analyzed in this Part can be avoided en-
tirely by authorizing the transaction giving rise to tax in the organization's governing instru-
ment, this Article will ignore the fact that all of these transactions in some sense apply supra-
trustee standards. If this Article did not ignore this fact, it would be impossible to distinguish
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"Trustee standards," as used herein, are those subsumed under various
excise tax provisions that regulate fiduciaries essentially in the same way that
the fiduciary duty of loyalty governs trustees of trusts. Similarly, "nonprofit-
corporate-director standards" are those subsumed under various excise tax
provisions that regulate fiduciaries essentially in the same way that the
duty of loyalty governs directors of nonprofit charitable corporations.
1. Supra-TrusteeStandards.-Fiduciaries presented with certain transactions
are essentially subjected to supra-trustee standards under the federal
excise tax regime. Consider the payment of compensation from a private
foundation to a disqualified person for "non-personal services." 2 ' Although
the duty of loyalty governing trustees of trusts does not appear to bar
compensation for "non-managerial" services provided in the course of
trust administration, such compensation has been held to constitute self-
dealing."' Because a fiduciary's decision to pay herself for these services
subjects her to excise taxation, she is effectively prohibited from receiving
compensation for them."' Another supra-trustee standard is that implicit
in the general imposition of self-dealing excise tax on private foundation
managers21s who participate in a decision to cause the foundation to enter
into a sales, 16 leasing,' or lending' transaction with a "disqualified
person" 19 who is not a foundation manager or related person. Most notably,
the self-dealing excise tax applies to these transactions between a private
foundation and a "substantial contributor" (a major donor), even one who
is not an officer or director of the foundation. In contrast, the duty of loyalty
does not categorically prohibit a trustee from engaging in such transactions
with the settlor of a trust if the settlor is not the trustee or a person related
to the trustee.
These supra-trustee standards are not confined to the private foundation
context. Similar supra-trustee standards apply in the case of the following:
(1) grants, loans, compensation, and "similar payments" from an SO to a
the differing fiduciary standards that the excise tax regime applies to various types of conflict-
of-interest transactions examined herein.
212 I.R.C. § 4941(d)(I)(D) (West Supp. 2010).
213 Madden v. Comm'r, 7 4 TC.M. (CCH) 44o, 449 (1997).
214 Indeed, in the case of a member of the governing board of a private foundation who
participates in the decision to pay another disqualified person-including a fellow member of
the board-such compensation would generally be subject to the excise tax on organization
management, notwithstanding that the member does not personally benefit from the transac-
tion. See I.R.C. § 4941(a)(2), (b)(2) (West Supp. zolo).
215 Id. § 494 1(a)(2), (b)(2).
216 Id. § 4941(d)(I)(A).
217 Id.
218 Id. 4941(d)(I)(B).
2 19 See id. § 4946(a)(2) (2oo6).
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substantial contributor to the SO;z 0 (2) grants, loans, compensation, and
"similar payments" from a DAF to a DAF insider; 2 2 ' and (3) donor-advised
distributions from a DAF that result in any DAF insider receiving, directly
or indirectly, more than an incidental benefit as a result of the distribution.2 1
In each of these cases, an organization manager who participates in the
decision to cause the charitable entity to make the described payments is
generally liable for excise tax,223 no matter how "fair" or "reasonable" the
terms of the transactions may be.
2. Trustee Standards.-The federal excise tax regime essentially subjects
charity directors/trustees to a trustee standard in another class of
transactions." The duty of loyalty governing trustees of trusts prohibits
most types of self-dealing between fiduciaries and the trusts that they
administer. This trustee standard generally applies in the case of the
following: (1) sales,225 leasing, 2 6 and lending2  transactions between a
private foundation and its directors and officers;2  and (2) loans from an
SO to a trustee/director of the SO.229 Of course, as discussed previously,230
the duty of loyalty permits a trustee to receive reasonable compensation for
her services. Thus, one may rightly glean an implicit trustee standard in the
exception to the private foundation self-dealing excise tax for payments
220 See id. § 4 9 5 8(c)(3)(A)(i)(I), (B)(i)-(iii) (West Supp. 2010). I have included the pay-
ment of taxable "grants" in the class of transactions subjecting fiduciaries to supra-trustee
standards because grant recipients could, in theory, be members of the charitable class served
by the charitable entity and be unrelated to trustees/directors. Such grants would not be pro-
hibited by the fiduciary duty of loyalty. The same is true of grants from a private foundation to
disqualified persons who are not trustees/directors or related persons; grants to such unrelated
disqualified persons are still presumably subject to the excise tax on acts of self-dealing, not-
withstanding that they do not necessarily imply breach of the duty of loyalty.
221 See id. § 4958(c)(2)(A). I classify the excise taxation of these transactions as implic-
itly imposing supra-trustee standards because DAF insiders have only advisory privileges,
and hence are not, strictly speaking, "fiduciaries" of their funds. Thus, transactions between
them and the sponsoring organization would not be prohibited by the duty of loyalty, as long
as the donor-advisor is not also a director of the sponsoring organization. That the fiduciaries
of a sponsoring organization are nonetheless subject to tax for approving these transactions
implies that they are subject to supra-trustee standards.
222 See id. § 4967(a)(i). The excise tax rules governing fiduciaries who approve payments
such as these essentially impose supra-trustee standards for the reasons discussed in the pre-
ceding note.
223 See id. § 4958(a)(2).
224 See Brody, The Limits, supra note 6, at 1435.
225 I.R.C. § 4 9 4 1(d)(i)(A) (West Supp. zoo).
226 Id.
227 Id. §4 9 4 1(d)(i)(B).
228 See id. § 4946(a)(I)(B), (b)(i) (2006).
229 See id. § 4 9 58(c)(3)(A)(i)(II) (imposing an excise tax on loans from an SO to a dis-
qualified person).
230 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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of reasonable compensation to a director/trustee who provides necessary
"personal" services to the private foundation."'
3. Nonprofit-Corporate-Director Standards.-The federal excise tax regime
essentially subjects charity directors/trustees to a modified nonprofit
corporate-director standard in a third class of transactions. Most conflict-
of-interest transactions are generally proper under nonprofit corporate
law if they meet either a procedural or a substantive test of fairness."'
Substantive fairness is essentially the nominal standard that governs
the following transactions under the federal excise tax regime: (1) all
transactions between a trustee/director and an unaffiliated public charity,
which are subject to the general EBTET regime;... (2) the payment of
reasonable compensation by a private foundation to a director/trustee for
necessary personal services2 3 (which payment is also consistent with the
trustee standard);2 5 and (3) transactions-other than a loan-between an
SO and any trustee/director who is not a substantial contributor to the SO,
which are subject to the general EBTET regime. 3 6
Moreover, the test of procedural fairness governing transactions
involving a nonprofit corporate director is approximated by the rebuttable
presumption of reasonableness under the Treasury regulations interpreting
231 See I.R.C. § 4 941(d)(2)(E) (West Supp. 2010).
232 See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
233 See I.R.C. § 4958(c)(i)(A), (B) (West Supp. 2010). In a transaction between a charity
and an interested director/trustee, the EBTET requires the charity to receive value equal to
the benefit conveyed. Thus, the Code can be viewed as imposing a nominal fairness require-
ment in conflict of interest transactions.
One qualification of this point is in order, however. Disinterested directors can escape li-
ability for the excise tax on management without ultimately establishing the fairness of the
transaction to the charity. As previously observed, a manager of an unaffiliated public charity
ordinarily is not subject to the excise tax on management under the EBTET regime if, after
full disclosure to an appropriate professional, she relies on the professional's reasoned written
opinion as to the propriety of the elements of the transaction. Treas. Reg. § 53-4958-i(d)(4)(iii)
(2002). Reliance on a professional is appropriate only if the professional is opining on a matter
within her expertise. Id. Moreover, a manager who does not know that a compensatory ar-
rangement is an excess benefit transaction escapes liability if she has acted with ordinary busi-
ness care and prudence. Id. § 53-4958-i(d)(6). Accordingly, one would expect that a director
who fulfills her state law duty of care in approving a conflict-of-interest transaction between
an unaffiliated public charity and another disqualified person generally would not be liable
for the EBTET on management. Stated another way, the general approach of the EBTET
is to assume that the state law duty of care usually establishes the appropriate standard for
evaluating the actions of disinterested directors of an unaffiliated public charity in deciding
the reasonableness of transactions between the charity and other insiders.
A similar analysis applies to those transactions in which the Code subjects directors of
private foundations and supporting organizations to nonprofit-corporate-director standards.
234 See I.R.C. § 4 941(d)(2)(E) (West Supp. 2olo).
235 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
236 See I.R.C. § 4958(c)(i), (3)(A)(i)(II) (West Supp. zoo).
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the EBTET"7 These procedural rules, which establish a semi-safe harbor
under the EBTET, apply to transactions involving "a compensation
arrangement[,] . . . transfer of property, or the right to use property."m23 Of
course, the rebuttable presumption technically applies only to transactions
between disqualified persons and unaffiliated public charities and to those
transactions between disqualified persons and SOs and DAFs which are
not associated with supra-trustee and trustee standards.239
IV APPARENT AssUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE
FEDERALIZED DUTY OF LOYALTY
This Part identifies important assumptions that appear to underlie
the federalization of the duty of loyalty under federal tax law. These
assumptions pertain to (1) the inadequacy of state law fiduciary standards
and enforcement mechanisms; (2) the inadequacy of the fundamental
income tax exemption requirements in ensuring adherence to the duty of
loyalty; and (3) other assumptions, sometimes conflicting, that relate to the
behavior of fiduciaries and large donors (and related persons) and appear to
underlie the federal excise tax system governing charities.
As a preliminary matter, I must preface my remarks with the caveat
that this Part merely sketches the assumptions that appear to underlie the
federalization of the duty of loyalty owed by charity fiduciaries under federal
tax law. Elsewhere, I have examined in detail the fiduciary assumptions that
appear to underlie the federal excise tax regime governing compensation
paid by charities.2 40 Thoroughly exploring these assumptions alone was
no small undertaking, and offering the same approach with respect to
all types of conflict-of-interest transactions is beyond the scope of this
Article. Although a comprehensive analysis of the fiduciary assumptions
underlying the federalization of the duty of loyalty must await another day,
a preliminary overview of these assumptions nicely serves the purposes of
this paper.
The most obvious assumption of the fundamental income tax exemption
requirements, as well as the federal excise tax regime, is that regulating
fiduciary behavior through the enforcement of state law fiduciary duties
is insufficient to encourage fiduciaries of all types of charities to behave
responsibly. 241 Otherwise, there would be little need for federal tax
rules that supplement state law; a charitable trust or corporation that is
recognized as such under state law could simply be exempt from federal
income tax. Precisely why state law is assumed to be inadequate is open
237 See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
238 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a) (2002).
239 See supra Part III.C.I-2.
240 See Buckles, Fiduciary Assumptions, supra note 99, at 64-107.
241 See id. at 102-03.
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to debate. Perhaps Congress believes that state attorneys general, who
oversee the operations of charitable entities, cannot adequately monitor
charity fiduciaries effectively. Although this "enforcement rationale"
finds considerable support,242 it has limited explanatory force. Were the
enforcement rationale sufficient, Congress could simply require, under
penalty of taxation, that fiduciaries exercise their state law fiduciary duties
or federal standards that correspond to the pattern of fiduciary duties
under state law. However, the multiple standards inherent in the current
legal framework-particularly those that inhere in the excise tax regime-
obviously do not perfectly track state law. Thus, although the federalized
duty of loyalty may assume that state law enforcement of fiduciary duties is
inadequate, it surely also assumes that state law standards implicit in the
duty of loyalty are inadequate, at least as they are currently applied.
Another assumption of the federalization of the duty of loyalty is that
the penalty of losing federal income taxation for an entity's failure to
satisfy the fundamental exemption requirements is insufficient to ensure
that charity fiduciaries will act as they should. Otherwise, the complex
excise tax regime, which penalizes fiduciaries for approving or engaging
in various conflict-of-interest transactions, would be unnecessary. The
assumption is logically premised on the lack of complete alignment
between a fiduciary's personal interests and the interests of the charity
that she governs. A fiduciary who desires to exploit a charity for private
gain may care little that the penalty for her breach of the duty of loyalty is
the loss of the entity's federal income tax exemption. On the other hand,
she may care greatly about incurring a hefty excise tax liability if she is
caught exploiting the charity. This observation highlights the reality that,
although the fundamental exemption requirements reinforce and to some
degree subsume the duty of loyalty, they alone present weak enforcement
mechanisms for ensuring adherence to the duty of loyalty by fiduciaries. 43
Another assumption of the federalized duty of loyalty is that multiple
standards of fiduciary conduct should apply in different contexts. As
explained previously, the excise regime employs three basic standards for
discharging the duty of loyalty: supra-trustee standards, trustee standards,
and nonprofit-corporate-director standards. Interestingly, only one of these
standards applies consistently to any single type of charity; the nonprofit-
corporate-director standard essentially applies to all conflict-of-interest
242 Ste, e.g., Brody, Whose Public?, supra note 6, at 946-50; Fishman, supra note 6, at 576-
77; Gary, supra note 6, at 623-24; Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An
Unfulfled State Responsibility, 73 HARv. L. REV. 433, 451-52 (I96o); Jonathan Klick & Robert
H. Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and Corporate Contro: Evidence from Hershey' Kiss-Off,
io8 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 816-19 (2oo8); Manne,supra note 6, at 25o-51.
243 Cf Reiser,supra note 50 (observing that the EBTET statute and regulations "better
align available remedies with the aim of maintaining charities' other-regarding orientation"
than loss of federal income tax exemption because the EBTET penalizes fiduciaries directly).
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transactions involving an unaffiliated public charity. In no other case are
the fiduciaries of one entity type subject to a single fiduciary standard.
Fiduciaries of private foundations are generally subject to supra-trustee
standards and trustee standards.3" Fiduciaries of SOs are subject to all three
standards in various circumstances.2 45 The members of the governing board
of an organization sponsoring DAFs are subject to supra-trustee standards
in the case of certain transactions between DAFs and DAF insiders;246 n
certain other transactions with DAF insiders, a "fairness" test applies.2 47
Perhaps even more fascinating is that not one of the fiduciary standards
employed by the federal excise tax regime applies consistently to any single
type of conflict-of-interest transaction. The payment of compensation
can subject fiduciaries to supra-trustee standards, as well as trustee and
nonprofit-corporate-director standards.248 The same is true of loans, sales,
leases, and outright grants.
The inconsistent application of fiduciary standards appears to reflect
conflicting assumptions about fiduciary behavior.2 49 A recurring theme
concerns assumptions about whether the risk of exploitation of charities
by insiders is sufficiently high to tolerate conflict-of-interest transactions
ostensibly entered into on terms that are fair to the charity. The private
foundation self-dealing excise tax regime, which largely subsumes supra-
trustee and trustee standards, generally assumes that directors cannot be
trusted to exercise their duty of loyalty. The regime apparently assumes
that any risk that value-enhancing transactions will be provided at a sub-
244 See supra Part III.C.i-2. As noted previously, the payment of reasonable compensa-
tion for necessary services is consistent with both a.trustee standard and a nonprofit corporate-
director standard.
245 See supra Part III.C.i-3.
246 See supra Part III.C.3.
247 Except in the case of loans, grants, compensation, and similar payments from a DAF
to a DAF insider, transactions between a DAF and DAF insiders are subject to the general
EBTET regime. See I.R.C. § 4958(f)(i)(E) (West Supp. 2olo). Insofar as that regime requires
that the charity receive a benefit equal in value to that which it conveyed, one could view the
statutory test as one of fairness, at least nominally. On the other hand, as previously observed,
a manager of a charity ordinarily is not subject to the excise tax on management under the
EBTET regime if, after full disclosure to an appropriate professional, she relies on the profes-
sional's reasoned written opinion in approving a disqualified person's transaction. Treas. Reg.
§ 53 -4 958-I(d)(4)(iii) (2002). Moreover, a manager who does not know that a transaction is an
excess benefit transaction escapes liability if she has acted with ordinary business care and
prudence. Id. § 53-4958-i(d)(6). A director who fulfills her state law duty of care in approving
the terms of a transaction between the charity and a major donor would therefore usually not
be liable for the EBTET on management. Establishing "ordinary prudence" would seem to
be a lesser burden than establishing fairness.
248 See supra notes 213-14, 231, and 233-35 and accompanying text.
249 For a discussion of these inconsistent assumptions underlying the excise taxation of
compensation, see Buckles, Fiduciary Assumptions, supra note 99, at 104-07. That discussion is
selectively summarized herein, and modified as necessary to examine numerous conflict-of-
interest transactions, not just compensation of fiduciaries.
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optimal level under current law is outweighed by the risk that, if interested
directors and major donors are generally permitted to transact business
with a private foundation, they will exploit it.zs0
In contrast, the rule permitting payment of reasonable compensation for
personal services provided by a disqualified person to a private foundation
assumes quite the opposite. The EBTET, as applied to unaffiliated public
charities, also assumes the opposite, for it implements a standard (fairness,
based on market value) to govern all transactions with a disqualified person.
However, the excise taxes imposed on certain transactions between an SO
and a major donor-namely, those involving grants, loans, compensation,
and similar payments-apply even when the terms of the transaction
are fair to the charity. Hence, the tax as applied to SOs assumes that, if
major donors and related persons were permitted to enter certain kinds of
transactions with an SO, the expected loss from exploitation of the charity
would exceed the expected loss from the under-performance of services
that may obtain under current law. The excise tax applied to DAF insiders
assumes essentially the same with respect to the same class of transactions.
Counter-intuitively, however, other transactions between an SO and a major
donor, or between a DAF and a DAF insider, are apparently assumed not to
present the same risks. Sales of assets between these parties, for example,
are subject to the general standard of the EBTET regime (fairness, based
on fair market value).
Certain supra-trustee standards reflect assumptions that merit special
comment. Most supra-trustee standards expand the class of transactions
effectively subject to the "no further inquiry rule" to include certain
transactions between the charitable entity and major donors. These
standards appear to rest on the assumption that fiduciaries are just as inclined
to further the financial interests of major donors as they are to further their
own financial interests; therefore, the rationale for a categorical prohibition
against transactions with interested fiduciaries applies equally to certain
transactions with major donors. The basis for this assumption is unclear,
and exploring it invites numerous questions. Why should the law assume
that fiduciaries are inclined to further the financial interests of major donors
who are unrelated to the fiduciaries? Is the prospect of future donations
from these same donors relevant to this inquiry? If this assumption about
fiduciaries applies to some transactions with major donors, why does it not
apply to all transactions with them? If the assumption is reasonable with
respect to fiduciaries of private foundations, SOs, and DAFs, why is it not
reasonable with respect to fiduciaries of unaffiliated public charities with
25o The implicit cost-benefit analysis that seems to underlie the general private founda-
tion self-dealing excise tax is similar to that underlying the "no further inquiry" rule of trust
law. For a discussion of this analysis, see Langbein, supra note 14, at 951-52; Robert H. Sitkoff,
Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Capital Market Effidency, 28 J. CORP. L. 565, 573-74 (2003).
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major donors? To what extent is the expected monitoring of charities by
the general public relevant to this inquiry?
Clearly, this section raises as many questions as it answers. At a minimum,
the discussion demonstrates that a thorough analysis of the assumptions
underlying the excise taxation of conflict-of-interest transactions across
charitable entity types is due.
V. ASSESSMENT OF THE FEDERALIZED DUTY OF LOYALTY
A. The Governmental Interest in Federalizing the Duty of Loyalty
For a number of reasons, the governmental interest in federalizing the
duty of loyalty is strong. The governmental interest in requiring substantive
fairness in conflict-of-interest transactions is very strong, and its interest
in promoting procedural fairness is reasonable. Let us first examine the
governmental interest in ensuring substantive fairness.
As explained previously, three fundamental requirements for obtaining
and maintaining exemption as a tax-exempt charity may be understood as a
federalization of the goal sought to be achieved through the law's imposition
of a duty of loyalty on charity fiduciaries-that the charity's operations
advance its exempt purposes, rather than other purposes (including the
private interests of fiduciaries and other persons). The governmental
interest in ensuring that a charity operates as intended is perfectly
legitimate. After all, the government refrains from taxing charitable entities
precisely because they perform a function that the government has deemed
to justify exemption from taxation. Advancing purely private, personal
interests does not, generally speaking, merit tax exemption. Ensuring that
fiduciaries not exploit charities for private gain-a chief purpose of the duty
of loyalty-through imposition of substantive fairness tests that inhere in
the tax regime is therefore justifiable. Hence, the federalization of the duty
of loyalty, subsumed within the fundamental exemption requirements,
appears entirely legitimate.
The federalization of the duty of loyalty subsumed in certain excise tax
provisions is likewise justified. Most obviously, fiduciary loyalty standards
implicit in the general EBTET regime applicable to unaffiliated public
charities, and to SOs and DAFs in the case of some transactions, reinforce
the governmental interest furthered by the fundamental exemption
requirements discussed above, especially the prohibition against private
inurement of net earnings. Insofar as many excess benefit transactions
give rise to private inurement, the EBTET discourages private inurement,
thereby furthering a significant government interest. One narrow feature of
the private foundation excise tax on acts of self-dealing functions similarly-
reserving the taxation of compensation paid for necessary personal
services performed by a fiduciary to instances in which this compensation
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is excessive."' Each of these excise tax provisions essentially imposes a
substantive fairness test to further governmental interests in ensuring that
charitable entities are indeed "charitable."
In situations where substantive fairness tests are insufficient to deter
fiduciary abuse, the government theoretically can also justify imposition
of trustee standards, and even supra-trustee standards. The government
has sought to do just that in certain contexts through the federal excise tax
regime.252 Such standards appear justifiable if they are the most feasible
way to ensure that a charity's operations further exempt purposes. Of
course, this observation ultimately begs the question of whether, and in
what circumstances, substantive fairness tests are indeed insufficient to
check fiduciary abuse. Unfortunately, as suggested by Part IV, it is at least
questionable whether the current excise tax regime governing charities
is based on a cogent analysis of the circumstances in which substantive
fairness tests are insufficient to check fiduciary abuse.
The government's interest in promoting procedural fairness is also
defensible. Long relied upon in the context of conflict-of-interest
transactions between fiduciaries and nonprofit corporations, procedural
fairness rules encourage fiduciary behavior that is likely to produce a
"fair deal" for the charity. Thus, the procedures necessary to invoke the
rebuttable presumption of reasonableness under section 4958 are sensible.
They both increase the probability that a charity will not engage in an
excess benefit transaction and promote compliance with the prohibition
against private inurement of net earnings. However, as I have argued
elsewhere,5 3 it is questionable whether the rebuttable presumption should
apply to interested fiduciaries themselves (as opposed to disinterested
fiduciaries who rely on the presumption to avoid the section 4958 excise
tax on management). The virtue of eliminating the presumption of
reasonableness as applied to financially interested disqualified persons
is that doing so would encourage them to provide services at a market
discount in order to make it obvious that no excess benefit transaction has
occurred.M
B. The Governmental Interest in Promoting Rational Uniformity of Fiduciary
Loyalty Standards
One may posit a presumptive case for the governmental interest in
promoting rational uniformity of fiduciary loyalty standards through the
federal tax system. As used herein, "rational uniformity" does not require
that only one set of loyalty standards govern fiduciaries through the Code.
251 See I.R.C. § 4941(d)(2)(E) (West Supp. 2oo).
252 Seesupra Part III.C.i.
253 Buckles, Fiduciary Assumptions, supra note 99, at 1 10- 12.
254 Id.
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Rather, rational uniformity requires that the tax regime subject fiduciaries
who engage in conflict-of-interest transactions presenting the same risk of
charity exploitation, and the same propensity to benefit charity, to the same
standards of loyalty. Rational uniformity (1) promotes efficient transactions
between fiduciaries and charities, and discourages those that are highly
likely to be inefficient; (2) tends to promote enforcement and compliance
with the Code, insofar as rules that appear to "make sense" are easier to
understand and apply; and (3) tends to promote equity, insofar as fiduciaries
who engage in similar behavior are taxed (or not taxed) similarly.
It is almost certain that rational uniformity of fiduciary loyalty standards
throughout the federal tax regime has not been realized. The current tax
regime creates and enforces fiduciary loyalty standards that vary widely
across entity types, and even across types of transactions engaged in by
the same. entity. As discussed supra,zss only in the case of conflict-of-
interest transactions involving unaffiliated public charities are fiduciaries
subject to a consistent standard of loyalty. Further, no single fiduciary
standard employed by the federal excise tax regime applies consistently
to any single type of conflict-of-interest transaction.256 This state of affairs
probably has arisen because the excise tax provisions that embrace various
standards of loyalty are based on underlying assumptions that often
conflict. A previous article has identified inconsistencies in the apparent
assumptions underlying the federal excise tax regime in its treatment of
compensation paid to charity insiders."' Because many other conflict-of-
interest transactions are subject to the same excise tax rules that apply to
compensation, similar inconsistencies in. assumptions probably explain
current law's excise tax system.as applied to conflict-of-interest transactions
in general."' The presence of numerous conflicting assumptions suggests
that the excise tax regime has not yet achieved rational uniformity.
C. Interaction Between the Federalized Duty of Loyalty and State Law Loyalty
Standards and Remedies for Breach
1. In General.-In some respects, federal tax law complements and
reinforces state law enforcement of the duty of loyalty. For example, the
fundamental exemption requirements to some degree incentivize the
discharge of state law fiduciary duties by those who govern tax-exempt
charities. Fiduciaries who discharge their duties of loyalty (and their duties
of care) reduce the likelihood. that their charities will violate fundamental
exemption requirements. Indirectly, the imposition of the fundamental
255 See supra Part IV.
256 See supra Part IV.
257 See Buckles, Fiductiary Assumptions, supra note 99, at 104-07.
258 As discussed previously, a complete exploration of these issues must await another
day-in another article.
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exemption requirements tends to heighten awareness among fiduciaries
of the standards of loyalty to which they are subject. Moreover, the
fundamental exemption requirements raise the stakes of breaching the
duty of loyalty. By monitoring compliance with fundamental exemption
requirements, the IRS essentially stands alongside state attorneys general
in scrutinizing conflict-of-interest transactions. Breaches of the duty of
loyalty that result in violation of the fundamental exemption requirements
are therefore more likely to be discovered. Finally, in some cases the
federal excise tax regime imposes standards on fiduciaries that correspond
to those established under state law, and therefore tends to reinforce state
law in some sense. Excise tax provisions imposing a trustee standard tend
to complement state law in its regulation of charitable trusts, just as excise
tax provisions imposing a nonprofit-corporate-director standard tend to
complement state law in its regulation of nonprofit charitable corporations.
However, federal law is not entirely complementary of state fiduciary
duties. The federalization of the duty of loyalty practically pre-empts
several features of state fiduciary law, and this practical pre-emption
may well impose costs on society. First, some transactions are effectively
precluded by federal law, notwithstanding that they are permissible under
state law and may add value to the charity.zs9 Consider, for example, the
sale of assets from a director of an incorporated private foundation to the
entity for a price clearly below market value. Because the below-market
sales price confers a benefit on the charity, the sale would be permissible
under the general loyalty standards under state law,o60 but the private
foundation self-dealing excise tax effectively forbids it as a general rule.16 1
The same tax also forbids the entity from lending to a director 16 -even if
the note bears above-market interest-and leasing assets to a directors6 3-
even if the foundation can extract above-market rental payments. The rule
effectively prohibiting an SO from entering into certain transactions with a
major donor or parties related thereto" also conflicts with typical state law
and similarly forecloses some value-enhancing transactions.
Second, disparate federal/state fiduciary standards tend to decrease
administrative efficiencies that would likely more fully obtain were
259 Cf Brody, The Limits, supra note 6, at 1429 ("Per se prohibitions sweep too broadly,
and void too many transactions that would benefit the charity and thus benefit the public.").
260 Of course, some state statutes now mimic the private foundation excise tax rules
by deeming private foundations to have governing instruments that forbid transactions giv-
ing rise to federal excise tax. See, e.g., TEx. Bus. & ORGS. CODE ANN. § 2.107 (West 2009); TEx.
PnoP. CODE ANN. § 112.055 (West 2007). These statutes are presumably designed to prevent
inadvertent violations of the federal excise tax regime, rather than to embrace the fiduciary
standards that inhere in the excise tax regime as reflective of general state policy.
26I I.R.C. § 49 4 i(d)(I)(A) (West Supp. 2010).
262 Id. § 4 94I(d)(I)(B).
263 Id. § 4941(d)(I)(A).
264 See id. § 4958(c)(3)(A)(i)-(ii), (B)(i)-(iii).
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governmental enforcement interests better aligned. When the federalized
duty of loyalty implicit in a federal tax provision corresponds to the duty
of loyalty under state law, one would expect state and federal government
enforcement efforts to improve. When one level of government discovers a
breach or possible breach, it can so inform the other level of government."s
Conversely, disparate standards of loyalty lessen the effectiveness of this
type of communication, at least to some degree. To illustrate, that an
incorporated private foundation has engaged in an act of self-dealing under
section 4941 by buying equity securities from a director says nothing about
whether the transaction is appropriate under state law. Should the IRS
inform a state attorney general of the act of self-dealing, the state would
still need to devote resources to investigate fully the reasonableness of
the terms of the transaction. Nonetheless, informing the state attorney
general that an act of self-dealing has occurred would direct her attention
to the transaction for further evaluation, thereby enhancing the overall
monitoring function of the state. Thus, the disparate standards still may
generate efficiency gains for the state, relative to a world in which the duty
of loyalty had not been federalized to any degree.
2. Nature and Purpose of Federal Sanctions and their Effect on State Law
Remedies.-
a. Nature and Presumptive Purpose of Federal Sanctions
Another relevant question is whether the sanctions imposed by federal
law for violating the federal tax regime's fiduciary standards interact well
with remedies available under state law when a fiduciary breaches her
duty of loyalty. The federal tax regime essentially is designed to (1) deter
fiduciary misconduct, as well as exploitation of charities by major donors
and persons related to them; (2) provide restitution to the government for
unpaid taxes when fiduciaries fail to operate the charity in accordance with
tax exemption requirements; (3) promote restitution to charities when their
fiduciaries breach a federalized duty of loyalty; and (4) penalize certain
charities when their fiduciaries breach a federalized duty of loyalty.
The tax regime deters fiduciary misconduct and donor exploitation
of charities primarily through the various excise taxes imposed on
disinterested managers"" and financially interested insiders.267 Though the
provisions imposing excise taxes are penal, they obviously are intended
to deter the types of transactions that give rise to tax. They do so not only
265 Under current law, the IRS does notify state governments of determinations of this
nature. Treas. Reg. § 301.6104(c)-I (as amended in 1981).
266 See, e.g., I.R.C. H§ 4941(a)(2), (b)(2), 4958(a)(2), 4966(a)(2), 4967(a)(2) (West Supp.
201o).
267 See, e.g., id. §§ 4941(a)(1), (b)(1), 4958(a)(1), (b), 4967(a)(1).
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by moderately taxing disinterested fiduciaries for complicity, but also by
heavily taxing interested insiders-thereby dramatically decreasing the
financial incentive to enter into disfavored transactions.
The tax regime provides restitution to the federal government primarily
by taxing the income of charities that have failed to satisfy the requirements
for exemption (even retroactively to the date on which the charity initially
failed the operational test).2w
The tax regime promotes restitution to charities, albeit imperfectly, by
imposing draconian second-tier excise taxes upon disqualified persons6 9
and/or charity managersz7 o who fail to "correct" a transaction with respect
to which a breach of a federalized duty of loyalty has occurred. In general,
"correction" requires "undoing" the transaction (or the unlawful benefit
conferred thereby on the disqualified person) so as to place the charity in a
position "not worse than that in which it would be if the disqualified person
were dealing under the highest fiduciary standards.""' Insofar as second-
tier excise taxes can be avoided only through "correction" of the transac-
tion in question, the tax regime tends to promote restitution to charities, or
at least recompense.
Under the EBTET, correction essentially requires the disqualified
person to pay damages and interest.272 Under the private foundation self-
dealing excise tax regime, correction generally requires the disqualified
person to rescind the transaction, and make certain that the private
foundation also receives (1) net profits realized by the disqualified from the
consideration supplied by the foundation in the self-dealing transaction;
and (2) the benefit of any post-self-dealing transaction fluctuation in
the market value of property involved in the act of self-dealing.2 3 Thus,
"correction" in the case of private foundation self-dealing transactions
more closely tracks restitution principles than in the case of excess benefit
transactions subject to the EBTET
Finally, some provisions of the Code penalize a charity itself when
its fiduciaries fall short of a federalized fiduciary standard. Most notable
268 See Rev. Proc. 10-9, 2olo-i C.B. 258. For a discussion of the effects of retroactive
exemption, see I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,813 (Mar. zo, 199o).
269 See, e.g., I.R.C. H§ 4941(b)(I) (200% tax), 4958(b) (West Supp. 2010) (200% tax).
270 See, e.g., id. § 494 1(b)(2) (50% tax).
271 Id § 4958(f)(6) ("The terms 'correction' and 'correct' mean, with respect to any ex-
cess benefit transaction, undoing the excess benefit to the extent possible, and taking any
additional measures necessary to place the organization in a financial position not worse than
that in which it would be if the disqualified person were dealing under the highest fiduciary
standards."); id. § 4941(e)(3) ("The terms 'correction' and 'correct' mean, with respect to any
act of self-dealing, undoing the transaction to the extent possible, but in any case placing the
private foundation in a financial position not worse than that in which it would be if the dis-
qualified person were dealing under the highest fiduciary standards.").
272 See Treas. Reg. § 5 3 -4 9 5 8-7 (b)(i), (C) (2002).
273 Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(e)-I(C)(2), (3) (1973).
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is section 507, which generally imposes a "termination tax" on a private
foundation for "willful repeated acts (or failures to act), or a willful and
flagrant act (or failure to act), giving rise to liability for tax" under the
private foundation excise tax regime.274 The tax equals the lesser of (1)
the substantiated amount of "the aggregate tax benefit" attributable to the
foundation's section 501(c)(3) status, or (2) the value of the foundation's
net assets.275
b. Effect of Federal Sanctions on State Law Remedies
Although the excise tax penalties surely do deter breaches of the
federalized duty of loyalty, they may to some degree curtail the effectiveness
or availability of state law remedies that an attorney general can pursue
when deterrence fails. For example, the initial tax imposed on a disqualified
person for engaging in an excess benefit transaction is twenty-five percent
of the excess benefit.7 6 Should the state attorney general desire, on behalf
of the charity, to collect damages or restitution from the disqualified person
for breach of the duty of loyalty, doing so may be more difficult when the
disqualified person must also pay the federal government twenty-five
percent of the damages.277
On the other hand, the second-tier excise taxes imposed under the
private foundation excise tax regime and under the EBTET regime appear
to encourage complete or partial restitution to charity, for "correction" is
what enables insiders to avoid these exceptionally steep taxes. Because
"correction" under the private foundation self-dealing excise tax regime
closely parallels restitution under state law, the regime appears to bolster
state law enforcement efforts, at least when the state attorney general deems
restitution available and desirable."' The same is true, to a lesser degree, of
"correction" under the EBTET regime. "Correction" under the EBTET
does not necessarily make the charity as whole as true restitution, but
neither does it foreclose a state attorney general from pursuing additional
remedies when there has been a breach of the duty of loyalty. Insofar as
274 I.R.C. § 507(a)(2)(A), (c) (2oo6).
275 Id § 507(c)(I), (2).
276 Id. § 4958(a)(I) (West Supp. 2010).
277 Another problem involves the effect that imposition of dual (i.e., state and federal)
monetary penalties on fiduciaries could have on prospective board members. Those who are
contemplating board service may refuse to serve if they perceive that the penalties for breach
of fiduciary duties for actions taken in good faith are excessive. Cf Brody, The Limits, supra
note 6, at 1413 ("[T]he fear of potentially high monetary liability discourages good directors
from serving.").
278 Of course, in some cases "correction" of a self-dealing transaction under section 4941
will exceed the monetary remedy required by restitution under state law, insofar as not all
self-dealing transactions are breaches of the state law duty of loyalty.
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"correction" under the EBTET regime results in partial restitution, it, too,
appears to augment state law enforcement efforts.
More problematic, however, are penalties imposed upon charitable
organizations themselves when their fiduciaries fall short of a federalized
duty of loyalty. Consider the private foundation termination tax. It is
triggered, and payable by the entity, when there have been repeated,
willful acts of self-dealing. This is so even when the acts of self-dealing do not
constitute breaches of the state law duty of loyalty.m7 9 Thus, in this instance,
federal law essentially forces the transfer of assets from a charitable entity
to the federal government, notwithstanding that charity fiduciaries may
have satisfied general state law standards of loyalty. In such circumstances,
it is difficult to see how a state's interest in overseeing charitable funds has
been furthered. Granted, the IRS has the authority to abate the termination
tax if the private foundation distributes all of its net assets to established
public charities,28 0 or if a state officer notifies the IRS that court-approved
corrective action has been taken to ensure that "the assets of such private
foundation are preserved for . . . charitable or other purposes specified in
section 501(c)(3)."2 81 But these grounds provide little solace for a charity
when its fiduciaries have done nothing to harm it, notwithstanding their
involvement in self-dealing transactions under section 4941. In situations
in which no insider has misappropriated charitable assets, it is even
questionable whether a state attorney general with limited resources would
seek judicial approval of a course of action to ensure that "the assets of such
private foundation are preserved" for charitable purposes. And even if she
did so-perhaps because she desires to protect the assets of a respected
regional private foundation from what amounts to confiscation by the
federal government-federal law would have essentially forced her to
expend limited resources that, in the absence of the federal law, she would
have considered better spent elsewhere. Thus, the private foundation
termination tax may well interfere with efficient state law enforcement of
fiduciary duties, at least in some instances.
The sanction of revoking federal income tax exemption for a breach
of the federalized duty of loyalty that culminates in private inurement
may also interfere with the remedy a state attorney general would prefer.
Consider a charity governed by a board that causes its earnings to inure
to the benefit of an insider. The IRS has the power to revoke the entity's
federal income tax exemption, even if the consequent income tax liability
279 Technically, all acts of self-dealing are improper under state law, for (i) a fiduciary is
generally required to obey the terms of the charity's governing instrument; and (2) federal law
requires a tax-exempt private foundation's governing instrument to prohibit it from engaging
in acts of self-dealing. See I.R.C. § So8(e)(I)(B) (West Supp. 2010).
280 See id. § 507(g)(I).
281 Id.
[Vol. 99692
FEDERALIZATION OF DUTY OF LOYALTY
is vastly greater than the amount of private inurement involved."' The
state attorney general may prefer to petition a court for equitable relief,
such as ordering the appointment of a new governing board and the
adoption of good governance practices, with the result that the charity will
continue as a tax-exempt entity owning most of its assets. The IRS may
prefer to subject the entity to federal income taxation, thereby depleting
the assets that can be used for charitable purposes. Because the IRS has
great discretion in revoking an entity's tax exemption when it has failed to
satisfy a fundamental requirement of exemption under federal tax law, the
IRS ultimately decides whether the state attorney general can effectively
pursue her preferred remedial course of action. Perhaps the IRS properly
wields this discretion, insofar as all entities operate with plain notice of the
requirements for maintaining exempt status. On the other hand, one could
argue that the discretion of the IRS should be sharply curtailed when the
charity has taken remedial action, under the supervision of a state attorney
general, to correct breaches of the duty of loyalty and to prevent future
ones from occurring.
CONCLUSION
Federal tax law dominates the fiduciary standards of loyalty governing
charity fiduciaries. It does so through the fundamental requirements that
charities must satisfy to obtain and maintain exemption from federal income
tax, and through the increasingly complex excise tax regime governing
charity fiduciaries and major donors. Current law effectively imposes at least
three fiduciary loyalty standards that apply across various types of charitable
entities and conflict-of-interest transactions. Although the law may rightly
impose these different standards, there are good reasons to doubt that the
current system is based on consistent, rational assumptions. Moreover,
the current federal tax regime may well complement state enforcement
of fiduciary standards in some contexts, but probably interferes with such
enforcement in others.
Where do we go from here? The problems identified in this Article
suggest a need for (1) conducting a more detailed analysis of the assumptions
apparently underlying the federal excise tax regime's treatment of conflict-
of-interest transactions; (2) developing a better framework for evaluating
(a) precisely what fiduciary standards should govern each type of charitable
entity, and (b) whether the answer to the preceding inquiry is contingent
on (i) the type of conflict-of-interest transaction in question or (ii) other
factors not currently accounted for under the excise tax regime; and (3)
reconsidering the federal sanctions that should apply to breaches of a
282 For a list of factors that the IRS considers in determining whether a charity's partici-
pation in transactions subject to the EBTET will result in revocation of the charity's federal
income tax exemption, see Treas. Reg. § i.501(c)(3)-I(f)(2)(ii) (as amended in 2008).
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federalized duty of loyalty, in view of their likely effect on remedial efforts
by the states.
